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# West Europe Report

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23 April 1985

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POLITICAL

AUSTRIA

DISSENSION, CONFUSION SEEN IN AUSTRIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY

Vienna PROFIL in German 4 Mar 85 p 18

[Article by Hubertus Czernin: "Alois Mock's Course Roils Federal States"]

[Text] That the mood at the residence of the People's Party (VP) general secretary at lunch last Monday remained flat, was not the fault of Maria Graff's culinary art.

That was where the VP General Michael Graff had asked the provincial secretaries of Salzburg, Upper Austria and Styria, Franz Schausberger, Helmut Kukacka and Gerhard Hirschmann, to come to explore why the irritation among the provincial functionaries over the course of the national VP had assumed the degree that had become apparent to VP headquarters in the days before through lots of telephone calls of protest.

The last impulse for this discreet lunch, which Marie Graff wanted to sweeten up with the roasted Cornish hens with jam and pancakes, was the resignation by the back seat black National Council member Ferdinand Manndorff over putting the Zwentendorf nuclear reactor into operation. "This really goes too far," wailed Hirschmann, "That third or fourth echelon people should try to dictate policy is unacceptable.

So lunch at Graff's was where the provincial trio got the PP troubles off their chest: The expanded, 22-member national party board was summoned by telegram for Saturday, 2 March, 1700 hours to come to the Political Academy in Vienna's Tivoligasse, "requesting your faithful attendance, Dr Michael Graff".

Comment by the Tirol VP secretary Robert Fiala before the meeting started: "I only hope this summit will get us somewhere."

Stormsigns are up indeed in Alois Mock's sixth year of tenure since the VP after the defeat in the Landtag elections in Carinthia and Vorarlberg last fall slumped from the poll-predicted heights into a protracted low.

Whatever the blacks would try to do, something always went awry.

First, on 28 November, the parliamentary club's unconditional "aye" on building the Hainburg power plant, when the confrontations over the Stopfenreuther Au were already foreseeable. Then the strenuous debate, only confusing the party membership, on the consequences of Hainburg. Finally, Zwentendorf and the Frischenschlager-Reder affair, when Mock, only after taking a breather and after being urged on by some exasperated VP functionaries, decided on a frontal attack--that got him at once vehement criticism from the provinces. Schausberger put it bluntly: "That really backfired on us."

Somehow then it comes down to Alois Mock's head, even if VP bigshots, like deputy chairman Erhard Busek, aver that a leadership discussion is the last thing the VP now needs. Said he: "Debates on personalities the VP surely does not need. If anything, then more political debates, including the provinces in them, because those we often do not get."

Down in party ranks things look different, to be sure. The functionaries are squawking that no one knows in the provinces where things are going, who has the say-so, and what Alois Mock's personal position is. "There is no clear line to be seen. The party chairman must call mandataries like Mannsdorff to account publicly, too" (Kukacka).

How large the upset has already become, Salzburg's party secretary Schausberger was repeatedly reminded of in recent weeks. His experience after some expanded local party executive meetings around Salzburg: Sympathy for Alois Mock is "absolutely there " But then again: "One would like a national party chairman who makes more of being the national party chairman."

But there is where the trouble lies in the good-natured Alois. He is good for the administration, good when the weather is good. But when things get tough, he lacks what any party boss needs: the ability to sweep people along. "Something like leadership," Vorarlberg secretary Juergen Weiss surmises. "People say he should galvanize them more."

A still tougher comment comes from Styria's Hirschmann: "There is one thing of which I cannot excuse a national party chairman. In two or three matters he just has to show the flag."

Hirschmann believes Mock's advisors are part of the malaise: "Partly, he does not have the most excellent staff. I wish the party chairman would set up an attractive group that does not hold party membership." And then Schausberger comes out in full: "A lot is due to what hangs around. Those who get his ears. Too much vanity and too many jealousies are involved."

For all that, what counts in the VP is that Alois Mock at long last shows who is the boss. Schausberger admonishes: "We are all ready to help Alois Mock because we like him, because he is likable. Yet there comes a time for brass tacks."

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CSO: 3620/305

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

GREECE ASKED TO TAKE ACTIVE PART IN NATIONAL ISSUE

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 7 Mar 85 p 3

/Article by Savvas Iakovidis/

/Text/ The recent statement by Greek government spokesman Maroudas on the question of a pan-national conference on the Cyprus problem is, to say the least, unfortunate, irresponsible and impermissible. Maroudas said: "Under the present political conditions in Cyprus, any conference of Greek and Cypriot political parties would give the wrong impression abroad that Greece intervenes in the internal affairs of Cyprus."

The Maroudas statement, made with Papandreou's consent and approval, is unfortunate because it tells the Greek Cypriots that Greece will remain a disinterested bystander and a neutral observer of what transpires in Cyprus. It tells them also that Greece is divesting itself of its immense national, conventional and other responsibilities and that, using camouflaging tactics, it hides behind the known dogma: "Cyprus decides and Greece supports."

But Maroudas and Papandreou (who hides behind his spokesman) cannot claim that Cyprus is in a position today to decide its present and future. Will Kyprianou make decisions? But, by all indications, he is representing a minority. The majority of the people do not trust him. But let us assume that the present crisis in Cyprus does not exist. How can it be possible for Athens to believe that the politically, diplomatically and militarily weak and impotent Cyprus is in a position to make decisions in the face of the politically strong, diplomatically skillful and militarily powerful Turkey? In other words, are Maroudas and the Greek premier openly telling us that they want to be interested in Cypriot Hellenism but only to the dogma Mengistu of Ethiopia and Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan are interested?

But on the question of the pan-national conference the Maroudas statement is also irresponsible. It is, moreover, insulting the intelligence and patience of the people in this section of Hellenism. Was it not Maroudas--again with Papandreou's consent--who characterized the Kyprianou-AKEL cooperation as "an unacceptable axis" and an "unnatural alliance"? Was it not Papandreou who said that "Lyssaridis always follows the proper line"? Was it not Papandreou who spoke of Kyprianou's "excellent handling" in New York? Were

not all these characterizations a "rude and unacceptable" (as the communists branded them) intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus? Or could there be two kinds of intervention: good and bad as the communist rationale accepts? The Maroudas wretchedness is sad as well as pitiful.

But the Maroudas statement about the pan-national conference is also impermissible. It is also indicative of the frivolous way official Greece faces the seriousness of the Cyprus problem. Finally, it is proof of Greece's inability since for 30 years it failed to plan, study, chart and implement a specific pan-national policy with regard to the Cypriot question. We ask the most talkative Maroudas: Is the demand justified of the Greek Cypriots to want the leaders of Greece--who are responsible for Cyprus' present misfortune--to meet and decide what we want? Is it an abominable act on the part of Cyprus to demand responsibility and seriousness from the leaders of Greece? The holding of a pan-national conference should not at all have been a subject for discussion.

If the leaders of Greece are indeed concerned, agonizing and struggling with the freedom of Cyprus and not about petty politics and personal and party interests, they should meet at their own initiative, to discuss the issues and reach decisions. But they are not interested in nor are they agonizing over the internal crisis in Cyprus. Neither Maroudas nor Papandreou--who curiously enough remains silent--nor Kyprianou, who is in the minority, nor AKEL which follows directions from a foreign power, can persuade us with their ridiculous and laughable arguments that a pan-national conference would be considered by other nations as an intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus. We ask all of them: What is of importance? What others will say or how Cyprus will be saved from Attilas?

We have said it tens of times that Greece is our motherland. It is the center of Hellenism. It has the gravest and most serious responsibilities towards Cyprus. Karamanlis and Papandreou, who have now hushed up their differences and keep silent, bear awful responsibilities. Their present eloquent silence and refusal to call a pan-national conference constitutes an evasion of their serious responsibilities. We repeat: If Greece does show interest in Cyprus and if it does not act as a catalyst in the present crisis, who else can take its place?

If Greece does not get directly involved and impose unity and national understanding and, especially, a pan-national policy as concerns the Cyprus issue, who will do it? Qadhafi perhaps? Honestly, the Cypriot Greeks cannot conceive Greece's political and diplomatic paralysis. But what they understand well is this: at this moment when our survival is at stake, Greece's leaders are virtually evading their responsibilities...

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CSO: 3521/226

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

CONTINUATION OF TALKS SEEN CRUCIAL

Nicosia 0 FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 17 Mar 85 p 3

/Excerpt/ We shall express some views concerning the region's political problems including, of course, the Cyprus problem--views other than the usual ones. Among the parties which express diverging views for solving problems there exists a continuous distance and evasion of even a contact.

In our case, how can the Cyprus problem be solved without talks between the leaders of the two sides? It could be that at this moment, during these months, the circumstances as a result of the political crisis in Cyprus--and in Greece--do not offer appropriate and advantageous ground for immediate talks but no matter what the case may be, no political party in Cyprus has given up the policy of talks. This is absolutely the correct course.

After this introduction, we now come to the main point of our article--to the presentation of some different views on why the Ozal proposal was interpreted by Athens as opportunistic--aiming to influence Washington in favor of Turkey. For argument's sake let us accept that such is the case. Why should we not be interested in what Washington says about the Greek-Turkish differences on the Cyprus problem and allow the Turkish premier to play his game in the international arena as he wishes?

The continued Turkish occupation is an obstacle and no Greek can accept the continuation of this curse. There is no Greek who does not want its termination. But how? With a war, with an aggressive action on our part, an action which--on the basis of international law--we are entitled to undertake but cannot? Therefore, if we want to see the occupation terminated we must have a dialogue. It cannot be otherwise. Is there anyone who thinks we can hold talks with the other side only after the termination of the Turkish occupation? If such a person exists then he is the most naive person born on this planet since the time a human being first appeared.

On the contrary, by avoiding such talks we achieve nothing but the continuation of the occupation. Proof: The nearly 11 years that passed since the 1974 tragedy. One could say: We had, in Cyprus at least, such talks and yet the occupation continues. True. But let us not forget that these contacts failed. They achieved nothing positive and that is why they should be

continued until the desired positive result is achieved. A ray of light appeared toward the direction of removing the occupation forces during the third round of the proximity talks in New York when such removal was formally agreed.

With the aforementioned views we do not claim that as soon as we received the Ozal proposal we should have gone to Sukare the following day for talks. No. Such talks must be methodically prepared so as to ensure all possible prospects for their success. But this proper procedure cannot be prepared by saying "no".

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

KOIVISTO ON 'ANTI-SOVIETISM,' UPCOMING CSCE MEETING

PM031407 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 29 Mar 85 p 14

[Unattributed report: "Pinpricks to the East Worry Koivisto"]

[Text] In an interview with the chief editors of Finland's centrist newspapers President Mauno Koivisto expressed a certain amount of concern about the tendencies toward anti-Sovietism which he believes he has been able to note in published material recently.

Koivisto said that he has noted that there is in Finland a sort of "sporting spirit" which is given expression in a competition to see who most dares to have a go at the Soviet Union.

It appears from the report of the meeting that the president got onto this subject during a question-and-answer session after considering in an introductory address the problems attaching to the superpowers' disarmament negotiations and to the level of the forthcoming CSCE jubilee.

He first affirmed that Finnish-Soviet relations continue to be good. This had been noted during his talks with new Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow. "But all sorts of little things are happening," he added, and went on to say that there is in Finland a sporting spirit which is expressed in a competition to see who dares to "carve up" the Soviet Union and to what extent.

According to Koivisto, such things have also happened in the case of other countries. Those who involve themselves in such activities, Koivisto said, represent "many levels, of course," but it has "clearly been possible also to note an intention to hurt." "Somebody always wants some applause..."

Fortunately this is not a dominant phenomenon, either in the case of the Soviet Union or of other countries. It is hardly possible to assert that there have been more stances intending to hurt the Soviet Union than stances with a content hostile to other countries, but our relations with the Soviet Union are the most important and most sensitive of our foreign relations, Koivisto said.

On the subject of the upcoming CSCE meeting the president warned against all too excessive expectations. "Great expectations could become unnecessary disappointments," he said to those who expect that the jubilee can be celebrated at head of state level.

"The CSCE jubilee is a valuable thing in itself. We must be satisfied if--as things do indeed look at present--the meeting can be realized at the political level."

Koivisto also warned against excessive expectations for the disarmament efforts. "There is at present a longed-for period of fine weather in international politics. However, this does not provide a guarantee that the superpowers will reach agreements on reductions in rearmament. The feeling of a period of fine weather is very strong, but it is founded on very insignificant factors. It would certainly be no miracle if after a while we were again living in an atmosphere of disappointment."

It is also clear from the report of the meeting at the palace that the president was surprised by the way in which one of the country's leading newspapers in a recent editorial declared the plan for a nuclear-free zone to be unrealistic. According to Koivisto the zone idea has only really gathered momentum in the last 3 years. The citizens of all the Nordic countries have a positive attitude to the project.

Koivisto made it clear that he personally considers that in the future the zone plan could be a partial solution worth bearing in mind when it comes to distancing the military alliances from each other. The president cannot find any reason to believe the opposite.

He also pointed out that the zone plan also has a psychological significance. "The project is valuable for this very reason, although it is impossible to realize immediately. It gives people hope."

Koivisto also commented briefly on Finnish People's Democratic League Chairman Kalevi Kivisto's recent proposal that the Finnish People's Democratic League should back Koivisto in the 1988 presidential election. "I was not exactly pleased by the proposal, although I did think that I understood Koivisto's motives..."

CSO: 3650/216

23 April 1985

POLITICAL

FRANCE

## CANTONAL ELECTION EXIT POLL ANALYZED

Paris LIBERATION in French 18 Mar 85 pp 8-12

[Article by Eric Dupin (LIBERATION), Gerard Grunberg (CNRS)[National Center for Scientific Research] and Beatrice Roy (Bull): "The Cantonal Elections in the Scanner"]

[Text] A poll conducted as voters left the voting places last Sunday speaks volumes for the tendencies of the electoral body within a year of the legislative elections. With a few surprises at the end: concerning the anchorage of the National Front, the division in the Communist base, the PS' relative advantage, the RPR/UDF cleavage, etc.

Thank God for the new breed of polls being conducted at the exits from the polling places. Thanks to this method, it is beginning to seem that the urns are nearly transparent. Any election may be a subject for dissection according to the rules. The Bull-BVA [expansion unknown] poll conducted last Sunday with 4,350 people who had just voted (on behalf of Antenne 2, RMC [expansion unknown], LIBERATION and PARIS-MATCH), makes possible a real scanner analysis of the 1985 cantonal elections. Not only of the first round, but also of the transfer of votes in the second round. The electoral body's progress since the 1984 European elections is measured precisely. And our poll makes it possible to understand how the legislative elections of the next few years are taking shape.

The principle of exit polling, which is common in the United States and which was introduced in France by the IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute] in 1983, is a simple one: voters are urged by pollsters to fill in a questionnaire (on their vote that day, their previous votes, their motivations and their sociological characteristics) immediately after voting. There are many advantages. Because many more people are surveyed than in a classic poll, more detailed analyses are possible.

They answer the questionnaires much more easily, which provides a more representative sample. Finally, they are more motivated just after making a political choice. The results of the investigation are all the more reliable.

## The Weaknesses in Bipolarization

Bipolarization is not moribund. But the left/right cleavage has become fragile. A minority of the voters are now being recalcitrant when it comes to making binary choices. This is indicated by the Bull-AVA [as published] investigation. In the first round of the cantonal elections, voters were interrogated on their intentions regarding switching for the second round. Communists and Socialists in particular revealed themselves as more tempted than they used to be to abstain when the candidate is of the other leftist party, than when they are confronted by the right in the election. The fact remains that the great majority of those who went to the polls on 17 March chose the party of the left that was running against the opposition.

We also emphasize that our poll, by force of circumstance, does not take into account the additional mobilization of the electorate between the first and second rounds. But that added participation appreciably benefited the left. Enough to give the illusion that the internal PS-PCF transfers were better than they really were.

### The Socialists are Becoming Allergic to the PCF

As far as PS voters are concerned, the union of the left seems to be thoroughly buried. Only a minority of them is now disposed to observe the old "Republican discipline" rule. More numerous are those who prefer to abstain rather than vote Communist when the second round offers a candidate of that persuasion against a representative of the classic right (see Table 1). This is a considerable novelty. Since time immemorial, of course, a minority of the Socialist voters have refused to switch to the PCF. But today, that electorate's anti-communism is largely in the majority. The PCF leadership's primary anti-socialism is still not without its effect.

One element, however, is beginning to minimize this phenomenon. In cantons where an outgoing communist elected representative faces the opposition, socialist transfers to the PCF are clearly increasing but not really numerous. In other words, Socialists are putting their anti-communism in abeyance in places where the PCF is really a part of the local landscape. Street-corner communists often have a better reputation than those in Col Fabien Square. The fact remains that in those places as well, the reflex of switching to the PCF is growing weaker.

Table 1. How Socialists Vote When the Choice is Between PCF and Opposition

Choices	All Socialist Voters	In Cantons Where Communists are Outgoing and PCF Faces Opposition in Second Round
PCF	42 percent	54 percent
Opposition	12 percent	10 percent
Abstention	46 percent	36 percent
100 percent		100 percent

Example: Choosing between the PCF and the opposition in the second round, 42 percent of socialist voters would vote PCF, 12 percent for the opposition and 46 percent would abstain.

## Communists Still Observe Republican Discipline

Until the evening of the first round, the PCF had allowed the threat to hover: the more left, the more automatic withdrawals. At the last minute, it revived the republican discipline. Its voters were expecting just that. Despite the polemics that are tearing the left apart, they are switching in the second round, by a two-third majority, to the socialist candidate when he is running against the opposition (see Table 2). Quite obviously, the idea of the left is still charged with meaning for communist voters. This should cause some reflection on the part of the PCF leaders who have been quick to declare that idea obsolete. PCF switch-overs to the PS are more numerous still in the cantons in which an outgoing socialist is confronting the opposition.

However, the communists' electoral fair play has also declined. Traditionally, over 90 percent of PCF supporters have rallied to the other leftist party in the second round. This was still the case in 1978, one year after the first rupture in the union of the left. That time is past. About one fourth of the communists are now refusing to vote for the PS. These die-hards draw the logical conclusions from the back-to-back dismissals of the PS and the right by the leadership of their party. At the electoral level, too, the recent rupture in the left appears to be much deeper than that of 1977.

Table 2. How Communists Vote When the Choice is Between PS and Opposition

Choices	All Communist Voters	<u>In Cantons Where Socialists are Outgoing and PS Faces Opposition in Second Round</u>
PS	69 percent	77 percent
Opposition	4 percent	4 percent
Abstentions	27 percent	19 percent
	100 percent	100 percent

Example: Choosing between the PS and the opposition in the second round, 69 percent of communist voters would vote PS, 4 percent for the opposition and 27 percent would abstain.

## The Extreme Right is Obstructing the Left in Large Numbers

Jean-Marie Le Pen, like Georges Marchais, was right to follow his troops. His electorate considers itself as far to the right as the PCF's electorate considers itself to the left. Their transfer rates are comparable and their die-hards are nearly as numerous as well. In opposition to the left, three fourths of the extreme right chooses the parliamentary opposition (see Table 3). One interesting phenomenon is that the supporters of the FN [National Front] see virtually no difference between a socialist and a communist. To them, the left is an enemy that does not split up.

Be that as it may, there exists among the extreme right, as among communists, an uncompromising, tough faction that puts the refusal to compromise before any other consideration. Those genuine extremists, however, represent a mere 2 percent of the electoral body.

Table 3. How the National Front Votes When the Choice is Between the Left and the Opposition

<u>Choices</u>	<u>Facing PCF or Opposition</u>	<u>Facing PS or Opposition</u>
PCF	2 percent	7 percent
Opposition	77 percent	76 percent
Abstentions	21 percent	17 percent
	100 percent	100 percent

Example: Choosing between the left and the opposition, 2 percent of FN voters would vote PCF, 77 percent for the opposition and 21 percent would abstain.

#### The Classic Right Rejects the National Front

Le Pen, Chirac, Barre and the rest--perhaps it all comes down to the same thing for certain socialist leaders. But not for the voters of the UDF and RPR. Hostility toward the left drives only one fourth of them to a hypothetical second-round vote for the National Front (see Table 4). For the most part, such a scenario sets them to fishing. Only a small minority carry defense of republican values as far as voting for the left. Even when the left is represented by a socialist. It should be noted, however, that the rally to the extreme right scarcely increases when the choice is between the PCF and the FN.

Table 4. How the Opposition Votes When the Choice is Between the Left and the National Front

<u>Facing PCF or National Front</u>		<u>Facing PS or National Front</u>	
PCF	4 percent	PS	18 percent
National Front	27 percent	National Front	25 percent
Abstentions	69 percent	Abstentions	57 percent
	100 percent		100 percent


Example: Choosing between the PCF and the National Front, 4 percent of the opposition voters would vote PCF, 27 percent would vote FN and 69 percent would abstain.

#### The Left and Right and Their Extremes

Shortly after the cantonal elections, the political landscape is singularly complicated. In the first round, things are simple. Each political force... [portion of text omitted from source]. But where does the decisive cleavage occur? Chart 1 considers two scenarios. On the one hand, classic bipolarization: left and right are represented by their respective dominant forces, the PS and the parliamentary opposition. We observe that 91 percent of the voters then agree to line up in one of the two camps. In other words, the vast majority of the French people then accept the cleavage. The country is divided electorally into two parts, to the advantage of the right.

But there is another scenario that may also be considered. What happens when the right/left combination causes difficulties for both extremes, the National Front and the PCF? In the first round, those two forces together represent barely one fourth of the electorate. In the second round, their zones of influence are broader. In the event of an FN-PCF confrontation, one half of the voters opt for one or the other, while the other half refuses to make any choice between them.

France thus finds itself cut up into three parts. Opposing the two minorities anchored at the extremes is a vast space occupied by moderation. Of course this scenario is more symbolic than real. It proves nonetheless that the presence of the National Front and the PCF's strategy are now disturbing the right/left bipolarization.



Key:

1. France cut up into two or three parts
2. Extreme left/PCF
3. PS/MRG [Left Radical Movement]
4. Miscellaneous left
5. Ecologists
6. Parliamentary opposition
7. National Front
8. 1985 cantonal voting, first round
9. Second-round cantonal voting in the event of PCF-FN confrontation
10. Second-round cantonal voting in the event of PS-parliamentary opposition confrontation

This chart represents the votes in the 10 March elections as they would be changed in the event of two different scenarios. The first line recalls the composition of the electorate in the first round. The second line represents the redistribution of that electorate in the event of an FN-PCF combination; in that hypothesis, 28 percent of the first-round voters would cast their votes for the PCF, 22 percent for the FN and 50 percent would abstain. Finally, the third line represents the redistribution of the electorate in the event of a PS-parliamentary opposition confrontation.

## First-Round Surprises

By the evening of 10 March, the politicians' hopes had been disappointed. This time, however, it did not really matter, because they had anticipated the result. There were no big surprises in the first round of the cantonal elections. Everything seemed to have happened as if the voters had simply repeated their European election votes. With only a few changes. Looking at it more closely, with the help of the Bull-BVA poll, the impression is confirmed by the performance of the die-hards. However, the analysis also provides some pleasant surprises.

## The Dissatisfaction Votes


The election of county councillors is only an incidental factor in cantonal elections. On March 10, the French people voted politically rather than locally. In addition, the majority chose a party rather than a personality. And three fourths of the voters used that ballot to pass judgment on the government's performance. With a strong proclivity to think ill of it. A mere 28 percent of the voters (pretty much those of the PS) intended to express their "support" for the socialist government. Conversely, 45 percent of those who voted signified their "opposition" to it.

For dissatisfaction must have been in the air. The electoral body is sick of moroseness. A majority (58 percent) of that body agrees that things are going "in a rather bad direction" in France. What is even worse is that voters think "things have a tendency not to go so well" for themselves and their families. What government could emerge from that kind of pessimism unscathed?

Here again we encounter the old thesis of the letting-off-steam vote that may have characterized the cantonal elections. The right hastened to explain its defeats according to the theory that they were the result of the time when it was exerting the power. It is not a false theory, however. Except for two important restrictions. On the one hand, the rejection of the government in place that is occasionally manifested by cantonal elections does not disappear as if by magic on the day the fundamental political choice is made. On the other hand, such dissatisfaction is multi-faceted.

Everyone knows that in France there are many sources of dissatisfaction. The principle one today is called "unemployment". In the first round, this was what 45 percent of the voters were thinking about when they deposited their ballots in the urns. The obsessive dread of unemployment occupies first place in the motivations of all electorates, from the PCF to the National Front. For the rest, each political group has its own obsessions (see Chart 2). Communists are afraid for their purchasing power. Socialists worry about social inequality. The classic right does not tolerate fiscal pressure well. As for the extreme right, lack of security and immigrants seem to them to be the two great evils of the present time. You might as well say that dissatisfied people of all allegiances are not ready to shake hands.

(1)



Key:

1. Voters' motivations
2. Opposition
3. Employment
4. Purchasing power
5. Inequality
6. Taxes
7. Lack of security
8. Immigrants

This chart represents the voting motivations of the four large voter categories. The polls were expected to indicate which two subjects had had "the most influence" on their votes on 10 March. We have shown the responses to the six subjects most often indicated.

Example: Seventy-one percent of the communist voters cited employment in either first or second position as the principle motivation for their votes.

## The National Front is Shrinking but Gaining Strength

On the face of it, the National Front fell back two points from its position in the European elections. Its national score went from 11 percent to 8.8 percent of the votes. In reality, the extreme right did not suffer a failure. Its influence has simply shrunk. The party of Jean-Marie Le Pen first suffered a slight mobilization of its supporters. A portion of those who had voted for it on 17 June 1984 did not go to vote where the FN was not running any candidates. That is to say, in one fourth of the cantons.

The National Front also suffered the consequences of the attraction exerted on one part of its electorate by the notables of the right. That attraction was limited, however: the extreme right's troops very largely voted for one party, and their thoughts were concerned with the national political situation. That electorate, which has been radicalized, reveals itself as not very sensitive to personalities and local issues. The fact remains that one fourth of the FN followers cast their votes for the classic right wherever it was represented by an outgoing RPR elected representative. A thoroughly implanted Chiracian does not leave extreme-right voters totally insensitive.

In sum, it can be believed that one point of the FN's fallback are to be explained by the characteristics peculiar to the cantonal ballot. The other point that was lost seems to be the result of a switchover on the part of the extreme right to the parliamentary opposition. One third of the Frenchmen who voted for Le Pen in the European elections declared themselves in favor of the opposition on 10 March (see Table 5). The majority of them did not abandon the extreme right for circumstantial reasons; two thirds of them really intend to support the classic right in the legislative elections. Thus, the FN did not manage to retain all of its electoral capital from 17 June. It appears, on the other hand, to be more isolated than it was last year. Very few of the parliamentary opposition voters seem to be tempted by the extreme right today.

This shrinkage of the FN's influence has its compensation, however, in the strengthening of its electorate. Its voting intentions for the legislative elections went from 6.4 percent on the day of the European elections (Bull-BVA exit poll) to 7.2 percent in the first round of the cantonal elections. The extreme right is losing some voters, but those who remain faithful to it are more inclined to stick. Sixty-three percent of the FN voters now intend to confirm that choice in 1986 (see Table 8). They numbered only 45 percent in the European elections. The extreme-right electorate has hardened. It has been purged of the minority of leftist voters that made up part of it last year. Looking ahead toward the legislative elections, the FN can count upon the determination of a majority of its present supporters.

## The National Front is Broadening the Base of the Right

The extreme right's electorate is more than just the shadow of the parliamentary opposition's. Certain characteristics obviously give them a family resemblance: over-representation of independent workers and under-representation of wage-earners in the public sector. The Le Penist public, however, is clearly distinguishable from that of the classic right. The FN's electorate is 60-percent male, while that of the parliamentary opposition is 55-percent female. The former is appreciably younger than the latter. It is also made up in greater proportion of laborers, clerical workers and managers. What is more, only 12 percent of the extreme right voters are practicing Catholics, compared to 23 percent of the classic right.

Table 5. From the European to the Cantonal Elections (in percent)

1984 European Elections Vote	1985 Cantonal Elections Vote, First Round					Total
	PCF	PS	Opposition	FN	Others	
LO	28	26	29	6	11	100
PCF	87	9	3	0	1	100
PS	5	80	9	1	5	100
ERE [expansion unknown]	2	36	48	3	11	100
Ecologists	6	30	37	3	24	100
UDF-RPR	1	3	90	5	1	100
FN	1	2	33	64	0	100
Abstentions	11	30	47	9	3	100
<hr/>						
All voters	13	26	49	9	3	100

Example: Of those who voted LO in the European elections and who went to the polls on 10 March 1985, 28 percent voted PCF, 26 percent voted PS, 29 percent voted for the parliamentary opposition, 6 percent for the FN and 11 percent for candidates of other organizations.


The electorates of the right and extreme right thus appear to be fiendishly complementary. The National Front enables the conservative forces to be more present in the categories in which they were least strong. We find, moreover, that the extreme right has accomplished no breakthrough in the Catholic regions of Western France. Its favorite terrain is not the traditionalist countryside but the large city, where social control is weak and where fear of the other is great. The resistance of the conservative rural areas has prevented nationalization of the National Front's influence.

As might have been expected, its electorate is situated firmly more "to the right" and "very far to the right" than that of the parliamentary opposition (see Chart 6). But we see also that 19 percent of the FN's voters say they are "neither left nor right". As if a single portion of its supporters had been transformed by a protesting rage. They are people to whom delinquency and immigrants are intolerable, but who have no need of the "national right".

#### Hard Right and Soft Right

Sandwiched between the temptation of extremism and the attractions of centrism, the rightist electorate is not without diversity. The hard right is in opposition to the soft right. This cleavage does not correspond exactly to the distinction between the RPR and UDF electorates. But it overlaps it in part.

On the sociological level, UDF supporters resemble those of the RPR. Both these sections of the right are roaring successes in the same social strata. Let us just note that the UDF attracts relatively more clerical workers and middle managers, while merchants, craftsmen and employers are more susceptible to the charms of the RPR.



Key:

1. The Various Electorates on the Left/Right Axis
2. Socialist Electorate
3. No answer
4. Very far left
5. Left
6. Rather left
7. Neither left nor right
8. Rather right
9. Right
10. Very far right
11. Communist electorate
12. (Parliamentary) opposition electorate
13. National Front electorate

Chart 3 example: 16 percent of communist voters place themselves "very far right".

Chart 4 example: 4 percent of socialist voters place themselves "very far left".

Chart 5 example: 3 percent of parliamentary opposition voters place themselves "very far right".

Chart 6 example: 21 percent of FN voters place themselves "very far right".

The specificity of these two electorates is nevertheless ideologically striking. We find that 39 percent of the RPR's voters (with those intentions for the legislative elections) are themselves situated "far right" or "right". Which is the case for only 24 percent of the UDF's voters. There are also many of the latter who place themselves "neither right nor left", while only 17 percent of the RPR's supporters adopt that resolutely centrist position.

Table 6. Who Voted for Whom on 10 March (in Percent)

<u>Voters</u>	<u>PCF</u>	<u>PS/MRG</u>	<u>Opposition</u>	<u>National Front</u>	<u>Others</u>	
All voters	13	26	49	9	3	100
According to sex:						
Men	14	26	46	11	3	100
Women	12	27	52	7	2	100
According to age:						
18-24 years	14	27	45	10	4	100
25-34 years	16	32	40	7	5	100
35-49 years	13	26	49	10	2	100
50-64 years	11	23	53	10	3	100
65-70 years	9	25	55	9	2	100
75 plus	10	23	63	3	1	100
According to Occupation:						
Farmer	6	19	65	5	5	100
Merchant, craftsman	5	15	63	15	2	100
Professional person, upper-level manager	7	28	52	10	3	100
Middle manager	14	30	43	9	4	100
Clerical worker	14	27	47	10	3	100
Laborer	27	27	34	8	4	100
Service personnel	18	24	53	2	3	100
No occupation	10	26	53	8	3	100
According to type of activity:						
Unemployed	17	27	43	9	4	100
Salaried employee, private sector	14	24	49	10	3	100
Salaried employee, public sector	16	36	37	6	5	100
Self-employed	6	15	65	12	2	100
Student	9	27	48	11	5	100
Retired	11	24	53	10	2	100
Housewife	10	26	54	8	2	100

Example: 14 percent of the men voted PCF, 26 percent PS, 46 percent for the parliamentary opposition, 11 percent for the FN and 3 percent for candidates of other organizations.

Farther to the right, the Chiracians also reveal themselves to be as allergic to the socialist government as the extreme right. On 10 March, 80 percent of the RPR voters voted against the government (81 percent of the FN voters). For their part, only 70 percent of the UDF voters gave that kind of protest significance to their votes. We note, moreover, that the RPR's base is more sensitive than that of the UDF to lack of security and to taxes.

There is consequently nothing surprising about Jacques Chirac's followers being distinguished by a slight rejection of the National Front. In the event of an FN-PS confrontation, 31 percent of them would choose the extreme right and a mere 10 percent would choose the socialist candidate. The UDF electorate's reactions are clearly better balanced: 17 percent for the FN and 15 percent for the PS. There is no doubt that the RPR-UDF cleavages mean problems for the parliamentary opposition. It will not be easy for it to bring both its radicalized wing and its centrist wing together permanently.

#### The Communist Decline has not Been Checked

The PCF's "slight readjustment" slogan decidedly does not stand up to analysis. That party's one-point gain in relation to the European elections (12.6 percent instead of 11.2 percent of the votes) does not herald any kind of spring. In those cantonal elections, the PCF simply took advantage of a "useful" socialist vote in favor of its more firmly implanted elected representatives. The communist electorate of 10 March actually includes 12 percent socialist sympathizers! Which represented 1.6 percent of the voters, more than the gain registered by the PCF in those cantonal elections. In other words, in many cantons a minority of socialist voters chose to place their confidence, in the first round, in the outgoing communists, because of their good personal image.

Nevertheless, those one-time communist voters have no intention of rallying to the PCF. Of course, 5 percent of the socialist voters of 17 June 1984 voted communist on 10 March (see Table 5). But two thirds of those have decided to go back to voting PS in 1986.

Since the European elections we have even observed a slight transfer from the PCF to the PS. These were 9 percent of last year's Marchais votes that had toppled over to the PS side this time. But in the legislative elections the PCF recovered only one third of these renegades. As for the other two thirds, these new socialists intend to repeat their votes for the PS.

In sum, the transfers between the PS and the PCF since the European elections seem to cancel each other out electorally solely on the level of the cantonal elections. The slight improvement in the communist vote must also be explained by a better mobilization of its electorate. There again, the party's local implantation plays a favorable role. But we note that the PCF considerably rectified its positions with young people 18 to 24 (five points more than in the European elections) and 25 to 34 (four more points), with laborers (four more points) and with middle managers (four more points). The cantonal election enabled the communists to cut a better figure with the traditional social base (see Table 6).

However, the PCF's leadership must not be delighted with it. Looking ahead to 1986, its party is sliding downhill. Its intended votes for the legislative

elections do not number more than 10.8 percent, as compared to 11.9 percent in the European elections. In terms of a decisive vote, the PCF has become weaker since last year. It did not check its decline at all by taking refuge in the opposition. On the contrary, the sectarian line adopted by its leadership has every chance of being seen as having been electorally expensive.

#### The Divorce Between the Communist Electorate and the PCF

This is the most surprising lesson emerging from this poll. Not only is the communist electorate divided today, but it is not following the direction set by the PCF leadership. Only 28 percent of those who voted for this party on 10 March meant to express "opposition to the government's performance". Georges Marchais is a member of the minority in his own electorate. For there were many more (33 percent) who wanted to "support" the socialist government. Forty percent of the communist voters still claim that their votes were not cast in reference to the government's performance.

It is apparent that the PCF base does not share the party's extreme harshness toward the government. The PCF leadership is more maximalist than its own troops. This explains why 42 percent of the communist voters consider the situation of the country to have evolved "somewhat in the right direction", as opposed to 47 percent with the opposite opinion.

Finer analysis of the communist electorate brings to the fore an interesting internal cleavage. There are virtually as many who say they are "very close" to this party; they are distinguished by their unitary options.

The majority of the hard core proclaim their opposition to the government and believe the situation in France is deteriorating. They include a strong minority of voters who are "very far left". These communist voters finally demonstrate little enthusiasm for voting socialist in the second round. The positions of the communists who are "rather close" to the PCF are diametrically opposed. The majority of those who support the government and consider the country's situation to be improving are crossing over en masse to the PS in the second round and rarely declare themselves as being "very far left".

Thus, the communist vote accommodates two subelectorates with contradictory expectations. There are those who are sticking to the present line and those who do not adhere to it. The former inevitably do not form the traditional base of the PCF. Many former communist voters are able to say today that they are merely "rather close" to their party because of their disagreement with its positions. An aloof stand that could, over the medium term, be expressed by a true rupture if the PCF locks itself into its isolationist strategy. Since the communist leadership has resolved to persist along that path, this is the source of a solid factor in the acceleration of the decline. Even recently one of the most homogeneous of all, the communist electorate is now being undermined by its own contradictions. The party's militants are not the only ones who are being torn apart by a violent identity crisis.

#### The Socialists Were Really Shaken up

Was it a shake-up or not? The overall statistics favor a socialist explosion. The PS went up from 20.8 percent in the European elections to 24.6 percent in

the cantonal elections. But these were local elections in which socialists were leaving office in one third of the cantons. The disappearance of the ERE-style left center and the near absence of the ecologist movement may also artificially inflate the score of the PS.

That party's electorate, however, was really shaken up. For the bonus to the outgoing party deprived the PS of a portion of its electors, to the advantage of the PCF. And finally the socialists are far from having recovered on 10 March the majority of those who voted ecologist or ERE in 1984. According to the results of our poll, the PS has unarguably regained part of the ground as compared to last year.

Where is this progress coming from? First, from an excellent mobilization of its own European elections electorate. But it has also been reinforced significantly by those who abstained on 17 June 1984. It is noteworthy that 30 percent of the latter voted PS-MRG in the first round of the cantonal elections, or 4 percent more than the entire electorate (see Table 5). Who are these new voters who flew to the assistance of the PS? To a certain extent, they are certainly traditional PS voters who overcame their disenchantment in the end. But the gain may also come from former communist voters. From those who, having broken with the party, abstained from voting Marchais in the European elections and who today are rallying to the PS.

The 1985 cantonal elections may perhaps mark the entrance of the PS into a new phase. One in which it would become attractive again, carried along by a context in which it is now actually the party of the French left. Today's socialists, moreover, have the benefit of a better fund of partisan sympathy. With 27 percent of the French people expressing a preference for it, the PS is ahead of the RPR (24 percent). All things considered, Lionel Jospin was undoubtedly wrong when he boasted on 10 March that he represented "France's foremost party".

#### The Socialist Electorate is Heterogeneous

As always, the socialist electorate is profoundly heterogeneous. From a certain point of view, it is a force. The fact that the PS is not being rejected by those in any party augurs well for a government party. But that sociological diversity is coupled with a political diversity that is more worrisome. On the left/right axis, the socialist electorate is divided into two halves--those who say they are solidly anchored on the left, and the moderates. And these differences of positioning are expressed by opposing strategic choices.

More than two thirds of the socialists who place themselves "left" or "far left" would vote for the PCF in the event of a PCF-FN confrontation. Barely one fourth would prefer to abstain. For the remainder of the socialist voters, the proportions are reversed. The majority of them would abstain and a bare one third would vote communist.

But the voters who are farthest to the left are also those who say they are closest to the PS. This nucleus remains a majority that is for the most part faithful to the union of the left. On the other hand, the most moderate voters, who make up the periphery of the socialist electorate, do not want to hear any talk about union with the communists. The PS can accommodate both groups without difficulty, as long as it confines itself to its present strategic uncertainty. But the problem will surely be acute when alliances must be chosen.

Table 7. If the Legislative Elections Were Taking Place Today

<b>7</b>	(1) Vote au premier tour des cantonales 1985	(2) Intentions de vote aux législatives 1986	Ecart le 10 mars 1985 (3)
Extr. gauche (4).....	0,7	1,6	+0,9
PCF .....	12,6	10,8	-1,8
PS-MRG .....	26	28,0	+2
Divers gauche .. (5)...	2,1	1,5	-0,6
<b>TOTAL GAUCHE (6)</b>	<b>41,4</b>	<b>41,9</b>	<b>+0,5</b>
Ecologistes (7).....	0,8	2,9	+2,1
UDF .....	] 49,1	17,6	] 48
RPR .....		25,5	
Divers droite .. (8)...		4,9	
Front national .. (9)...	8,7	7,2	-1,5
<b>TOTAL DROITE (10)</b>	<b>57,8</b>	<b>55,2</b>	<b>-2,6</b>
	100 %	100 %	

Key:

- |   |                        |
|---|------------------------|
| 1. Vote in 1985 first-round cantonal elections      | 5. Miscellaneous left  |
| 2. Voting intentions for 1986 legislative elections | 6. Total left          |
| 3. Difference on 10 March 1985                      | 7. Ecologists          |
| 4. Extreme left                                     | 8. Miscellaneous right |
|   | 9. National Front      |
|   | 10. Total right        |

Voters who voted in the first round of the cantonal elections were asked for which party they would have been "most likely" to vote if these had been legislative elections. Example: 0.7 percent of the voters voted in the first round of the cantonal elections for the extreme left, but 1.6 percent would have made that choice if these had been legislative elections.

Dotted Legislative Elections

Even though it appears to be, the electorate is not frozen. The cantonal election of course confirmed, grosso modo, the power struggle that emerged in the 1984 European elections. But detailed analysis of it reveals movements of opinion that failed to mask the apparent stability. The PCF's electoral capital is still eroding. The electoral capital of the PS is taking advantage of an undeniable shake-up. As for the extreme right, it is managing to anchor itself in the political world.

Public opinion has shifted since 1984. It may evolve further between now and next year. All the more so because the legislative battle brings the central government into play, which is not the case with cantonal or European elections. This means that the voting intentions polled today have no power to influence predictions for the future (see Table 7). In 1986, anti-government

reflexes will be better balanced by the fear that the right will return to governmental affairs. That simple fact should make the abstainers on the left thaw out, at least partially.

Table 8. From the Cantonal to the Legislative Elections

(1) (2) VOTE CANTONALES 1985 INTENTIONS DE VOTE LEGISLATIVES 1986		PC	PS-MRG	Opposition	FN
Extrême-gauche (3)		4	3	0	0
PC .....		79	1	1	0
PS-MRG .....		11	85	4	1
Divers gauche (4)		3	3	1	0
Ecologistes (5)		1	3	2	1
UDF .....		1	2	33	8
RPR .....		1	2	33	8
RPR .....		1	2	49	16
FN .....		0	1	3	63
Divers droite (6)		0	1	7	11
		100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

Key:

1. 1985 Cantonal vote
2. Voting intentions for 1986 legislative elections
3. Extreme left
4. Miscellaneous left
5. Ecologists
6. Miscellaneous right

Example: 4 percent of the communist voters in the first round of the cantonal elections would have voted for the extreme left if these elections had been the legislative elections, 79 percent would have voted PCF, 11 percent PS-MRG, 3 percent miscellaneous left, 1 percent ecologist, 1 percent UDF and 1 percent RPR.

The fact remains that the electoral landscape will not be unrecognizable in 12 months. France hardly has any chance of again discovering that its heart is with the left in March 1986. The conservative scale weighs too heavily in the balance for anyone to be able reasonably to imagine a turnaround in public opinion.

This is not the only lesson of these cantonal elections. Analysis of the vote indicates that the communist decline may be accelerating. For the present, the party of Georges Marchais accounts for about 10 percent of the votes. On the 1986 horizon, the hypothesis of a fallback in the neighborhood of 7 to 8 percent is by no means to be ruled out. For the PCF is threatened with seeing itself abandoned by the unitary part of its electorate. That part remained faithful to communist candidates on 10 March, but did not share the choices of their leadership. The PCF is in danger of not benefiting from the same

tolerance in 1986. The electorate is often slow to sanction a party's positions; not until 1981 did communist voters reward the PCF for its anti-unitary change of direction in 1977.

For the PS, the future is not rosy, but some hope is permissible. Several factors encourage one to think that the objective of approaching the 30-percent line is not beyond the range of possibility. The socialists' cantonal shake-up may be a sign that public opinion is in a new vein. They can also hope to be the chief beneficiaries next year of the anti-right vote, and to recover a portion of the communist electorate. In any hypothesis, the PS' claim that it is still "France's foremost party" does not appear to be unrealistic.

Another major factor for 1986 is the installation of the National Front on one edge of the electorate. It is not impossible that the parliamentary opposition, especially the RPR, may manage to cause the extremist epidemic to be pushed back. All the more so because the "useful vote" phenomenon will play against Le Pen's party in the legislative elections. In spite of this, the National Front is well placed to cross the line of 5 percent of the votes.

This scenario is not one likely to cause rejoicing in the ranks of the classic right. The conjunction of an appreciable ascendancy on the part of the PS and a settling of the National Front's electorate would make it especially difficult to obtain an absolute majority of the votes. The contribution of the extreme right would remain indispensable if the threshold of 50 percent of the votes is to be crossed.

This shows to what extent the cantonal elections, as seen by the Elysee, militate in favor of a method of proportional balloting for the legislative elections. The PS would no longer have to be concerned about transfers of communist votes. It could legitimately hope to count on a bare one third of the National Assembly seats. Above all, the RPR and the UDF would have the utmost trouble obtaining a parliamentary majority without the National Front's deputies. The door would still be open to multiple combinations.

#### The Pulpit is Reactionary

Religion leads to conservatism as much as it ever did. Eighty-four percent of the voters who go to mass every Sunday are voting for the right. And only 16 percent are voting for the left. On the other hand, 73 percent of voters "with no religion" cast their votes for the left, the right receiving only 26 percent of their votes.

#### The FN Voter

The vote of the extreme right is not "grade school level". It is in the FN electorate that the percentage of voters who did not go beyond that level of education is the lowest. In the PS, this electorate is the most elitist: 26 percent and 27 percent, respectively, of their voters attended graduate school!

POLITICAL

FRANCE

#### BACKGROUND, INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF NEW CALEDONIA

Paris ETUDES in French Mar 85 pp 293-303

[Article by Jean-Pierre Gomane, dated 14 January 1985: "New Caledonia and France's Presence in the Pacific"]

[Text] Generally speaking, the French have a rather precise notion of the territorial outline and human reality of that portion of the nation situated in Europe, still commonly called the "mother country" [*metropole*] in reminiscence of colonial days, although the term no longer has any avowable administrative significance.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, they recall the existence of a distant France, the remnant of its overseas domain, in but an episodic, picturesque or dramatic fashion. The scattered, disparate and evolutive nature of that entity leads, it is true, to confusion or indifference. At times, its existence is even ignored, whether or not deliberately.<sup>2</sup>

When one evokes these regions, it is too frequently in the narrow perspective of domestic politics. The overseas territories and departments are then the object of rivalries, controversy, demagogic and vote-getting competition. These populations can add an interesting, even decisive, element to elections. Their specific problems can place the central government in difficulty.<sup>3</sup> Thus, for most observers and protagonists on the mainland, this reality, poorly perceived because of its very distance and complexity, is transformed into a vulgar additional excuse for internal quarrels. The importance of the international environment in the situation and the evolution of these regions is thereby largely diminished or even totally ignored.<sup>4</sup> Despite tardy and often deplorable recurrences, such is the case of New Caledonia. French diplomacy seems to have taken a very long time to lend consideration to such a reality.

#### International Reactions

The internal difficulties afflicting New Caledonia are not recent. However, we shall refer to them only insofar as they are undeniably worsened by outside influences. Nor are these recent, and it would have been wise to analyze them before they manifested themselves in a troubling manner.

## Kanaka and Melanesians

The people on the mainland have only recently become aware, through the dramatic events of recent months, of a cultural, ethnographic, even national fact now known as the "Kanaka situation." But this Kanaka situation fits into a far more vast unit made up of the Melanesian world. This ethnic group, highly divided but constituted of several million human beings,<sup>6</sup> is concentrated in the southwestern region of the Pacific. It therefore includes people living on islands and archipelagos which have themselves gained independence, in almost all cases, following historical processes different from one country to the next, over the past 20 years.

Let us point out the most important country of the group based on its population, a veritable giant in the Melanesian world which, for that reason, enjoys definite prestige and influence. It is Papua New Guinea, which alone has 3 million inhabitants, the vast majority Melanesians. There are other archipelago nations of which one has particular importance with respect to the events in New Caledonia. A neighbor of that overseas territory, it was in addition, at least half under the authority of France through an original and complicated status, the result of the traditional rivalry between the two great colonial powers in the region. This was the French-British condominium of the New Hebrides, which became independent in 1980 under the name of Vanuatu. The reaction was general indifference, at least in France, not only on the part of the public, but apparently, the government at the time as well. And yet, as the result of contagion and the domino effect, the evolution of the status of New Hebrides in the end sealed the fate of New Caledonia.

Furthermore, France was suspected -- wrongly, it would appear, for such suspicion would amount to unduly attributing to it a coherence it never demonstrated, there or elsewhere, with respect to the evolution of overseas territories -- of opposing that accession to independence in a devious, indirect manner. From that time on, our presence in the South Pacific has had an unfavorable image. The abortive rebellion of one of the islands of the Vanuatu Archipelago, Espiritu Santo, confirmed that impression due to the precedent of the Comoro Islands, when the secession of Mayotte was officially ratified, if not provoked, by the French Parliament.

## France an Intruder

Beyond this geographically limited Melanesian area, other influences have been exercised throughout the region of the South Pacific. Certain powers are essentially made up of inhabitants of European origin: Australia and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand.<sup>8</sup> Other islands are for the most part peopled by South Sea islanders belonging to another ethnic group, smaller but more scattered throughout the entire region of the Pacific than the Melanesians: the Polynesians.<sup>9</sup>

The first archipelago, a former colonial territory, to become an independent autochthonous state was the Western Samoans in 1962.<sup>10</sup> If we had been interested in the overall evolution of that area, we could have witnessed a continuous process of accession to independence that has taken place over the past 20 years. But, with our vision clouded by other regions of the world more familiar and closer to us, we were not attentive to that phenomenon so fraught with immediate or future consequences for French territories in the Pacific, beginning with New Caledonia.

For their part, the nations in the region appeared to be concerned over playing an active role in an evolution which they wanted -- not without legitimate reasons -- to see come about without incident or upheavals.<sup>11</sup> Actually, outside of the case of the French territories, the authority of New Zealand and especially of Australia was exercised for varying lengths of time over nearly all the archipelagos in the South Pacific, with one or the other taking the place of Great Britain.<sup>12</sup> The lasting influence of this historic factor made up of the French-British rivalry, already mentioned in connection with Vanuatu, should not be underestimated. The French presence has always been considered as incongruous, sometimes intolerable, by the British and those who succeeded them.<sup>13</sup>

More recently, the coastal nations have become roused -- rightly or wrongly -- over the presence of the French Nuclear Testing Center in Polynesia, for political and ecological reasons. Finally, Australia and New Zealand consider themselves to be the main victims, particularly regarding agricultural exports, of the British membership in the EEC, due to the prompting of President Pompidou. The French position is therefore considered without sympathy and quite systematically criticized, while in Australia, public opinion is profoundly indifferent to international problems as long as they do not affect that country's interests and vicinity. One should therefore not be surprised that, whatever the pertinence of arguments that France might pit against its detractors, the problem of New Caledonia and subsequently, that of Polynesia, are considered, and not without excessive malevolence, as a sequel of French colonial imperialism.

### III Effects of Detente

But beyond the mere regional balance in whose maintenance Australia plays an important role, one cannot isolate the South Pacific from the rest of the planet, and one should not neglect the overall geopolitical dimensions of the problems of the area. The world is still largely dominated by the rivalry of two major powers: the United States and the Soviet Union, which is labeled "bipolarization." To date, mainly thanks to a formal military alliance concluded at the end of World War II by Australia and New Zealand with the United States, known as ANZUS, that region has been removed from Soviet penetration and even influence.

And yet, Moscow has never given up strengthening its positions in the world vis-a-vis its rival. The indirect strategy, the one which uses all factors of destabilization and weakening of what must be called the Western camp, can only be reinforced by the freeze on direct confrontation, jointly and ostensibly sought through the resumption of arms control negotiations. The rejection of the "Sar Wars defense" could well be paid for by a resurgence of tension in peripheral areas of the world in relationship to the vital, direct interests of the two superpowers.

In the South Pacific and elsewhere, any hotbed of disorder, dissent or insecurity could be maintained, directly or indirectly by the USSR, for such a situation would facilitate the obvious and otherwise legitimate strategic aims of that great power of confronting its rival. The victory of the communist camp in Vietnam enabled the USSR to make an advance toward the south of some 4,000 kilometers, from the Okhotsk Sea to the South China Sea. Why would it not seek to take advantage of favorable circumstances in order to pursue that progression and make a dent in the strategic arrangement of the United States in the Pacific?

There are precedents, as the Australians well know, even if certain circles, trying to redeem themselves for abandoning Eastern Timor to its sad fate, now try to salve their conscience at France's expense by encouraging the independence of New Caledonia. Seen from Canberra, relations with Paris are infinitely less important, in fact, than relations with Djakarta!<sup>14</sup> But Australia in no way wants the establishment on its periphery of one or several hotbeds whose official ideological sympathies and economic relations would be toward the USSR under conditions that have allowed us elsewhere to label as "mini Cubas" <sup>15</sup>

Proposals of cooperation from the USSR are periodically made to independent nations in the South Pacific and appear to be a means of blackmailing Western nations, including Australia, in order to get economic aid. Australia does not intend to take France's place with regard to the financial contribution already being made and which will probably be continued to New Caledonia, independent or not, or accommodate the possible presence of Soviet advisers less than 500 kilometers from its shores.<sup>16</sup>

#### France's Assets

It would have been better to plan long-term solutions ahead of time. Having failed to do so, one must now improvise and try to apply the necessary brutal measures in a time of crisis. It is not our purpose to add more proposals to the already excessively numerous ones made. We simply intend to show that, however democratic the measures drafted and satisfactory for all concerned, which seems highly desirable but in no way likely, one must in addition gain their acceptance by outside partners, already prejudiced against any French measure.

### Cooperation, Alibi or Justification for a Presence

Questioned by the political leaders of certain countries, France is much better accepted than is sometimes believed in Paris by scientific and academic circles, particularly those involved in development research. The various French research organizations are extremely active in the South Pacific area and maintain excellent working relations with their foreign colleagues. Thus, thanks to the action of a small number weakly encouraged by the metropolitan tutelage authorities, who do not consider the Pacific area as having priority, France's influence stretches beyond the territories placed under its authority and in domains whose usefulness is unquestioned because of the low degree of economic development of those small, weak and poor nations of the South Pacific.

Furthermore, the almost exclusive presence of Anglo-Saxon experts from the United States or Australia, the flow of investments or equipment from Japan make cooperation with other partners highly desirable in the minds of the leaders of those countries. The USSR remains in the area of impulse or, for some, distrust. One therefore has the European nations, individually or better, in community form. The Lome Convention, despite its inadequacies, appears to be a fundamental element in the perspective of relations between Europe and the countries of the Pacific.<sup>17</sup> We had personally hoped that the third set of negotiations to renew that Convention would take place in a country of the Pacific for essentially symbolic reasons.<sup>18</sup>

It seems to us that it is through cooperation that France, whatever the fate of the territories still institutionally linked to it today, will maintain, in the Pacific and elsewhere, an influence whose positive nature is not questioned by anyone. However, it must have the will to continue and, if possible, strengthen that cooperation.

### Diplomacy of Dialogue After That of Scorn

France believed for too long that the problems of its overseas territories in the Pacific did not concern anyone but itself.<sup>19</sup> That attitude, perhaps justified in strict terms of constitutional law, in no way took today's international realities into account. In that domain, our reactions were tardy and simplistic. Furthermore, the real or supposed ill will of independent countries in the region spared us from asking questions about our own inertia and blunders.

It is a fact that the reticence, even the opposition -- mainly of Australia -- are real, as we recalled, but they are not the only explanation of our difficulties. If France had drafted a coherent, evolving policy for the region, which is far from obvious in the eyes of South Pacific countries, one would still have had to present it to them for the sake of information at least. One cannot reasonably blame them for being concerned about the

overall evolution of a region to which they belong and in which events taking place within a given territory cannot fail to have repercussions on the equilibrium of the zone. In no way is it a matter of meddling in the internal affairs of a territory of the French Republic. The active diplomacy of the latter was quite tardy in manifesting itself and if any reference to other countries was made, it was generally in a negative fashion.

Our official representatives, who do not seem to mind traveling, could have gone to the region to initiate a dialogue, even on the occasion of contacts of a technical or scientific nature. Moreover, that is what has happened, although quite late.<sup>20</sup> In order to initiate international negotiations, the media are perhaps not the most effective means, for they force one into a simplification of sometimes highly complex situations. Nor is this the most discreet means.<sup>21</sup> The countries in the Pacific would be very honored to exchange official visits with Paris, as they do with other large countries in the world, and to receive visits from high French officials.<sup>22</sup> This has been slow in coming about and consequently, a dialogue has not been engaged when it would have made it possible to expose to officials in the region the French plan for the future of the South Pacific. But first, it would have been necessary for a French plan to exist, either in the past or only recently! Our remark is valid for the period previous to 10 May 1981 as well as after. This chronological detail is aimed at proving that our critical considerations can in no way be labeled as partisan.

#### Title XII or Article 88

Necessity seems finally to have developed our curiosity and imagination. One begins to observe certain situations which, in the area of New Caledonia but outside the territories in which France still exercises its authority, are not without analogies with that of our island. Names foreign to our ear, such as Tokelau, Cook and Niue, are finally brought up because these are territories "freely associated" with New Zealand. Thus it is that one boasts the merits of the multiracial society of the Fiji Islands and their complex electoral system based on the different communities, without thereby being criticized as racist.<sup>23</sup>

Nor must one be guilty of the opposite excess, seeking all references and precedents, even those whose comparison with the situation of New Caledonia appears to be the most artificial, not to say insane. One must compare that which is comparable: To bring up Hong Kong regarding the future of Noumea proves that one is familiar with neither, especially their respective environments.<sup>24</sup>

Furthermore, if one carefully reads the 1958 Constitution, one can rejoice that the "cleanup" of that document, so oft recommended, was not carried out, for the passages of that text to which one now refers would without any doubt have been officially deleted, having fallen into disuse until now, when there is finally consideration of reviving them.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, we can see how difficult it is to improvise on-the-spot solutions. New Caledonia

could provide an opportunity to extrapolate and generalize the problem of the evolution of overseas territories, inasmuch as no one has had the idea or the courage to do so when independence was gained by the Comoro Islands, the territory of Afars and Issas, even Vanuatu.<sup>26</sup>

Perhaps one must even envisage the evolution of the overseas departments in longer-range terms.<sup>27</sup> One can now recognize, somewhat rightly, the legitimacy of the pluralism of cultural, economic and administrative personalities, even within the metropolitan framework. How obvious the individual nature of those remote communities now appear!

To Article 88 of the constitution, which is made up of Section XIII alone and whose draft already seemed difficult to accept in 1958 by possible partners, we prefer Section XII which, for its part, seems easier to use, mainly thanks to the provisions included in Articles 85 and 86.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, specific agreements of a bilateral nature can be negotiated in the most varied domains, including military, and remain in force for a long time to come, as we suffer the effects, unfortunately, on another continent.

Beyond the institutions to create or modify or diplomatic instruments to be negotiated, it is mainly a matter of maintaining or restoring a network of solidarity that will enable certain independent nations located throughout the Third World and not only in Africa, not to break with the old colonial power, a break which most present or future leaders in no way want.<sup>29</sup> The European path could also be better utilized, inasmuch as the institutional framework already exists, as we previously recalled, in the form of the Lome Convention.

A multiracial New Caledonia could have appeared as a kind of forerunner to a multiracial France.<sup>30</sup> Such was our hope, and we do not believe it is necessary to give it up. Our partners in the Pacific, critical but not systematically malevolent, as is too frequently claimed in France, remain extremely attentive to that experience.<sup>31</sup> To situate ourselves on the international level to which we have confined ourselves, the Caledonian problem may have contradictory effects on France, whatever its outcome.

The difficulties we encounter in this part of the world risk accentuating the tendency to withdraw, not to France, but to the immediate geopolitical environment, more familiar if not easier! It is the new transformation of the famous trilogy whose illusions we once denounced.<sup>32</sup> The overseas territories and departments now appear to be the stakes, at once symbolic and very real, of a forced "worldization," inasmuch as they are scattered over -- or off the coast of -- all the continents. These territories and, probably in the future, these departments will at some time difficult to specify probably take some institutional, and therefore, political, economic and cultural, distance from France. However, this in no way means that they will break with their former mother country. Perhaps we shall even see, following a period of transitory tension, an inverse orientation of the intensification of relations of different kinds, as one can see through different precedents.<sup>33</sup>

But even if, at least for a time, these territories should cease all relations with France, the latter is nevertheless doomed to maintain an active presence throughout the world, in the Pacific and elsewhere. Economically speaking, this seems obvious, but also on the political and cultural level. The reference to Europe very generally appears, as we pointed out for the Pacific, as a palliative to the much more formidable action of the great political, military or economic powers. In this latter domain, it is obviously Japan that is in question in the Pacific.<sup>34</sup>

The need for a French presence in the area is therefore only very partially linked to the territorial responsibilities that our country bears for the time being. This neo-Caledonian episode, however painful it may be, can in no case give rise to France withdrawal from the region where it is taking place, under penalty of extending that withdrawal to the entire globe. Let us beware of a withdrawal that is too much our tendency, a withdrawal that would consist in self-eviction from an area of the world whose current and, even moreso, future importance and vigor are now, even in a Europe excluded by such an evolution, unanimously recognized.

(Ed. Note: ETUDES has previously taken up the problem of New Caledonia, in Gabriel Marc's article: "Fate of the French Overseas Territories. The Example of New Caledonia," March 1981, pp 293-304.)

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Let us point out, however, a few hesitations that one sometimes perceives regarding the administrative structures of those fragments, "metropolitan" but situated overseas in the former sense of the term -- that is, the islands bordering on the continent, from the largest, Corsica, to the small Breton or Poitou archipelagos. As for the Anglo-Normand islands, their status would leave more than one French (and perhaps British!) citizen puzzled.
2. Thus, many statistics, strict by definition, do not even specify, when reported to the public at large, whether the overseas territories and departments are or are not included! By this omission, deliberate or not, of an essential clarification, one sets about concealing the sometimes profound economic or cultural differences with the so-called "metropolitan" departments of Europe.
3. By the interplay of geographic situations on both sides of the date line (which crosses the Pacific following the approximate route of the 180° meridian), New Caledonia votes in national elections before mainland France, French Polynesia after. In 1967, the political world was hanging on the results of the latter territory, inasmuch as the majority was hanging by a single vote.

4. At other times and under a different majority, the accession to independence of another overseas territory, the Comoro Islands, was the object of an internal quarrel of the majority at that time. It is partly for that reason that Mayotte was separated from the other islands of the archipelago, with the difficulties of all kinds, including international, that it has since caused.
5. "Kanaka" quite simply means "man" in Polynesian. It is the Europeans who mistakenly and tardily attributed the term to just the Melanesians thus gave it a depreciatory, if not pejorative, connotation. We have retained the most common spelling, with the substitution of "K" for "C" mainly having the purpose, it would appear, of "de-Frenchifying" a term which at any rate is but a phonetic transcription.
6. A number difficult to give precisely because of the geographic dispersion of the group and its numerous mixes, but which probably does not exceed 5 million.
7. For a territory scarcely bigger than France, but in a difficult natural context (relief, climate).
8. The case of New Zealand, which rouses little interest in France (there are few works on the country) would have deserved more sustained attention, for after a period of bloody antagonism in the 19th century between European settlers, essentially British, and natives of the Polynesian family, the Maori, that country succeeded in forming a relatively harmonious "biracial" society whose attachment to the British mother country is still very profound. It should be recalled that in 1982, New Zealand proposed sending a warship to help the Royal Navy in the Falkland Islands. It should also be mentioned that it was a famous New Zealander mestizo singer who had the honor of singing Handel at the venerable Westminster Abbey at the marriage of Prince Charles. She has since been made a dame by the Queen.
9. The Polynesians, less numerous than the Melanesians (between 1 and 2 million) are still much more mixed than the latter. Actually, nicknamed the Vikings of the Pacific, in ancient times they visited and settled that vast maritime space that has since been divided up by the various European and American powers (without forgetting Chile).
10. The latter had belonged to the German colonial empire before World War I. In fact, Wilhelm's Germany was extremely active overseas and not only in Africa, as the French believe, who care about nothing else.
11. In general, accession to independence have taken place in the Pacific under more peaceful conditions than in other regions of the world. We shall later see the positive role played by this unimitated, if not inimitable, institution which the Commonwealth is.

12. Naturally, one must point out the territories which, under different terms, remain dependent on the United States, but except for the American Samoans and a few isolated islands, they are located in the North Pacific (if one thus labels the portion of the Pacific situated in the Northern Hemisphere): Hawaii and Micronesia. For more clarifications on this subject, see our article "Anticolonialism in the Foreign Policy of the United States, Especially the Pacific," to be published in L'AFRIQUE ET L'ASIE MODERNES.
13. Added to this political dispute, especially in the 19th century -- one may well ask whether the quarrel is over -- is the rival religious preaching between Protestants and Catholics, with France, although anticlerical at home, claiming to protect, in these regions and the rest of the world, the Catholic missionaries. The latter nearly all belonged, in the Pacific islands, to French congregations: Marists, Fathers of the Sacred Heart, without counting the women's congregations. However, one should point out the astonishing personality of one Belgian priest, Father Damien Demulder, who died serving the lepers in Hawaii and who was made a national hero by that 50th American state. His statue has been erected before the capital building in Honolulu.
14. The Australians do not constitute a homogeneous entity. Australia is a highly pluralistic country. It is therefore dangerous and not true to generalize about the reactions of that people, whose public opinion manifests an indifference already emphasized to international problems. As for the political leaders, whatever their affiliation, they are increasingly aware of the fragility of the geopolitical environment of their country, very precisely, since the appearance, at the beginning of the 1970's, of Soviet warships in the Indian Ocean.
15. In "Le Pacifique, Nouveau Centre du Monde," Berger-Levrault, 1983, p 173. We shall not come back in detail to the problem of Timor, which was dealt with by H.-J. de Dianoux in "Le Timor Oriental. Une Tragedie Passee Sous Silence," ETUDES, June 1981, pp 725-744. It should be pointed out that the Granada affair in October 1983, although that island is in another region of the world, helped open the eyes of observers and officials in Washington and especially Canberra to the fragility of island-states in the South Pacific and the Caribbean and to the general consequences that certain local changes in the political and ideological orientation of the leaders of those nations could produce.
16. The USSR can also act in a more concealed manner or even allow other lackeys to act, as relations between certain extremist pro-independence circles in New Caledonia and Colonel Qadhdhafi tend to show.
17. Along with Mauritius, the Fiji Islands appear to be one of the main beneficiaries of the European sugar agreement.

18. In order to issue a solemn reminder that the Lome Convention is not a Euro-African agreement as some declare, pretending to believe it, but rather, a Europe-Africa-Caribbean-Pacific accord. This world dimension of the European presence in the developing world seems to us to be vital to the future of two categories of partners: the industrialized countries of Europe and the developing nations. Nothing in principle or in practice opposed the renewal of that agreement being ratified in Suva, capital of the Fijis, as we publicly proposed by way of provocation. See "Perspectives du Pacifique," LE MONDE, Saturday, 8 May 1982, p 8.
19. It was and is true of the territories, even overseas departments located in other regions of the world (see below).
20. Thus it was that the first time a French minister in office went to Australia, it was the minister of industry in 1979. The scientific community of the region was invited, but only after 1981, to observe in person the apparent consequences of nuclear testing in Polynesia.
21. However, let us note that the recent communique of the Australian Embassy on the very delicate subject of the Aborigines was, in addition to a masterpiece of diplomacy rejecting any controversy, of perfect accuracy, matched by a kind of humility by virtue of the recognition of past mistakes.
22. We learn through the Asian press (does the French press mention such an event without great significance for it?) that Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone will undertake a major trip to the South Pacific, which will take him, not only to Australia and New Zealand, but also to Papua-New Guinea and the Fiji Islands.
23. The Fiji Islands are scarcely known to the French public other than as the name of a perfume. It would be interesting to know why and how that name was chosen. We have not pursued our investigations into that subject with the manufacturer any further!
24. Let us recall a few figures that we shall round off: Hong Kong, 5 million inhabitants; Noumea, 50,000 (100 times fewer). Environment: for the former, 1 billion Chinese from the People's Republic; for the latter, 100,000 New Caledonians outside of Noumea (10,000 times fewer). The journalist, by way of commentary, could at least have had the prudence to write "mini Hong Kong." The figures on trade and financial activity or port tonnages would be much more eloquent. Actually, it would more modestly be a matter of a free zone such as Djibouti is now establishing.
25. These passages are made up of Section XII, "On the Community," and Section XIII, "Partnership Agreements." Such was the tenor of the response to a consultation that we requested from the legal department

of the Constitutional Council as early as 1983, concerning the operation of the Community (response dated 14 October 1983).

26. All accessions to independence that took place, let us recall, under the preceding presidential term, which should make opposition spokesmen much more careful in remarks that sometimes, by analogy, appear to be self-accusing after the fact.
27. It is probably an accident, but highly symbolic nevertheless, that disturbances took place simultaneously in New Caledonia and Guadeloupe and even Reunion, previously so calm.
28. Article 88 seems to stem directly from the colonial ideology in its most generous and utopian aspects. Moreover, it would have been particularly aimed, we were told, at nations emerging from French Indochina. Is it necessary to state that the latter, independence as early as 1953, absolutely ignored it? Actually, the article refers to nations desiring a partnership with France "in order to develop their civilization"! Articles 85 and 86, on the contrary, provide terms for the revision of provisions of Section XII, the possibility of liberal agreements and above all, compatibility between independence and membership in the community.
29. Vanuatu (new name for the independent New Hebrides) became, ipso facto, a member of the Commonwealth. On the other hand, it no longer enjoyed any institutional tie with France. Of course, the Commonwealth is inimitable, despite certain attempts and certain appeals, but is it not unfortunate that the conferences periodically bringing together with the president of France the chiefs of state of developing countries be limited to Africa? Where is the officially desired world dimension? Where is the great vision of the so-called North-South relations?
30. See "La France Multiraciale de l'An 2000," ETUDES, April 1979, pp 487-501.
31. At a conference on the Pacific held in Washington in October 1983, we were personally able to observe how our remarks in that direction were heard sympathetically by the representatives of countries and territories in the Pacific, including by the representatives of Micronesia, Polynesians of American nationality. Concerning Micronesia, see above, footnote 12.
32. See "Les Limites du Trilogue," LE MONDE, Tuesday, 25 March 1980, p 2.
33. Even on the military level. To cite a single example, the independent Republic of Djibouti now houses the same French military apparatus, sometimes strengthened compared with what it was in the overseas territory of Afars and Issas, without France suffering any of the diplomatic problems it then confronted, particularly in the UN Decolonization Committee.

34. Having recently visited Thammasat University, the scene of the tragic events of October 1973 and considered to be the most radical and the most oppositional of the Thai institutions, we observed a spectacular boycott of Japanese products there. We asked our hosts, in jest, naturally, if that campaign was not financed by the trade departments of the French Embassy!

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CSO: 3519/212

POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

BRIEFS

DISSENSION WITHIN ANTI-CRUISE MISSILE GROUP--Serious dissension has arisen within the "No Cruise Missiles Committee" (KKN) regarding the course to follow. In November 1981, KKN could still organize the biggest demonstration ever. The tendency towards increased radicalization, with civil disobedience as its prime manifestation, especially irks the moderate wing of the KKN. Within D'66, ever louder voices advocate the Party's leaving the committee, especially if any government decision on the deployment of cruise missiles is to be rejected in advance. D'66 President, Jacob Kohnstamm, LL.M., confirmed this yesterday. If within the next couple of weeks KKN does not indicate its willingness to change positions, the committee will have to reckon with the possibility that D'66 may leave. And if D'66 leaves, Kohnstamm, says, that could produce a snowball effect. "The 'Federation of Dutch Unions' (FNV), too, doubts whether it can remain faithful to current radicalism. The same goes for the moderate wing of the 'Inter Churches Peace Council' (IKV), headed by Mient Jan Faber," Kohnstamm says. The dissension may be caused by the preparation for the plebiscite which the committee wants to hold. D'66 --and FNV and IPV in its wake--insist that by no means the impression should be created that with this plebiscite a decision regarding the cruise missiles can be made. That would be pure skulduggery. Within the KKN there is also a disagreement about the question to be asked. The radicals want to ask the people whether deployment should be rejected under all circumstances, whereas D'66 rejects a unilateral no. Instead, the moderate wing says: no, in principle, unless there are possibilities of reaching an international agreement on the intermediate-range missiles implying substantial reductions in East and West. [Text] [Amsterdam DE TELEGRAAF in Dutch 21 Feb 85 p 3] 12861

CSO: 3614/71

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

'SOARISM' VIEWED AS CONTINUATION OF 'EANISM'

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 26 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Jose Miguel Judice: "'Eanism,' 'Soarism,' 'Situationism']

[Excerpts] A significant article by Antonio Barreto went unnoticed, perhaps because it was published in a magazine with limited readership. The subject was the vacuum left after 10 years of an Eanes presidency. Barreto concluded that it would be impossible to write a biography of Eanes, since, after all, he did not do anything, he did not write anything and he did not put his seal on anything. The article, written by a man who, tired of hesitating in taking a position, gave himself wholeheartedly to Soares, surely more justified by the preparation of a political struggle against a hypothetical military candidate than by the literary desire to dissect a failure. But what seemed to be most significant was not addressed: how was it, how is it possible that Eanes was elected twice, in spite of having been supported by radically different people, in spite of having been a paralyzer, a destroyer, a president who lived in Belem for 10 years like he would have lived for 10 years as a barracks commander?

I believe that Ramalho Eanes was possible and is possible precisely because he is who he is, precisely because of the faults attributed to him by Barreto.

Success and survival are related to everything that would have justified a failure, to everything that, in the end, constitutes all the motives for which it is unhealthy for the country to have a continuation of 'Eanism' through other means. At a certain point, the former minister of agriculture writes: "He is not of the right, he is not of the left. He is not a capitalist, neither is he a socialist or a communist... He exercises power for power, without a program or responsibilities, without will or energy, without a meaning or goals... An excellent simulator, he let his political cowardice be called courage, he masqueraded passivity as a threat and he transformed irresponsibility into the last guarantee of democracy... After being elected, he never fought for anything or anyone, but perhaps only for himself, and that, with the least possible effort." This hair-raising evaluation is, paradoxically, the explanation through the absurd of the reasons for success.

Ramalho Eanes won because of everything that is politically repugnant or inconceivable, but which is deeply anchored in the meaning and the evolution of a regime which entered its agony in its full period of youth: if Eanes had not been like he is, and if he had not behaved like he did, he would never have survived as he did.

The reader will easily understand that to reach this conclusion is both unpleasant and destructive. In spite of the fact that it has nothing to do with atavism, it is nevertheless certain that Portuguese society was molded by "Salazarism," "Marcellism" and by the present regime into a society in which success is achieved by the methods, the acts and the forms that characterize the holding of power by Gen Eanes. The Portuguese want--and polls confirm it--private initiative and socialism, economic development and control of inequalities, the liberty to dismiss workers and secure employment, capitalism and socialism, public enterprises and their termination. The Portuguese like inconsequential threats, they like serious faces which they confuse with seriousness of character, they like formal gestures and the theater of family life scenes. Above all, they like to conciliate the irreconcilable, to attack the state and depend on it, they like all that corresponds precisely to the opposite of what Portugal needs in this historical period.

It is in this context that one must interpret "Soarism" as a civilian form of "Eanism." In spite of all that separates them (and in this respect, I have no hesitation in preferring Soares to Eanes), Mario Soares is the continuation of "Eanism" through other means. It is the language adapted to each interlocutor; it is the disproportion between words and acts; it is the promises countered by everyday events; it is the inconsequential stance; it is the divergence between the will and the declaration transformed into a method for political action; it is the gap between true will and declared will; it is the enthusiastic adherence one day to what was rejected yesterday; it is paralysis masquerading as decisiveness.

All of this is "Soarism." But let's call a spade a spade: worse than "Soarism" as a continuation of "Eanism," is "situationism," that avid situationism that has taken hold of large areas of the PSD. It is worse for obvious reasons, since "Soarism" is a tactical opportunism and situationism is a strategic--not to say vital--opportunism.

Indicative of all this is the way in which the PSD is pushing a military candidacy. What is wanted is not a candidate who will effect a break, but a candidate who will use the words for a break in order not to bring about one, a candidate-alibi, a candidate-good conscience, a candidate-smokescreen. The sole reason that is being used for the choice of a military candidate is, after all is said and done, the conviction that he will be supported by all those whom the PSD has been attacking for the past 6 years. Those who advocate a military candidate are those who say that the PSD and the CDS votes are not enough, they are those who, without confessing it, are getting ready for an alliance with the PRD

[Democratic Renewal Party], especially if the PRD attains a high percentage of the vote. That is why the support of a Firmino Miguel candidacy is not innocent: as things are now, the Firmino option is the option of a victory secured through an alliance between the leftovers of the AD [Democratic Alliance] and the PRD. And this is exactly what it will mean politically, no matter how great an effort is being made to hide it.

CSO: 3542/156

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

SOARES SEEN ABANDONING 'SOCIALISM' FOR 'SOARISM'

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 30 Mar 85 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva: "Does 'Soarism' Exist?"]

[Text] Following Rui Machete's famous phrase about "Eanism" and "Soarism," a doubt arouse: do "Eanism" and "Soarism" really exist, or are they merely two words created to obtain a certain literary effect? The answer is: "Eanism" and "Soarism" indeed do exist.

Further: in Gen Eanes' political area, the only reality that in fact exists is "Eanism" (that is, personal fidelity to a man, since the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] has no political program), and "socialism" in Portugal is disappearing in order to be replaced by "Soarism."

In reality, while the PSD and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] continue to exist as parties--because there are groups of interests and people who move in these areas and often pronounce themselves against the respective party leaders--in the Socialist Party all demands have ceased and all interests are presently subordinated to the interests of Mario Soares' candidacy for the presidency.

It is well known that the PS today is ready for all concessions--be they of principle or programmatic--if this will contribute to the support of Soares' candidacy.

This means that "socialism" is ready to cease its existence in order to allow the appearance of "Soarism."

However, it would be too hasty to affirm that all those who are adhering to "soarism" are doing it opportunistically or simply to curry favor. We can even say that there are two types of "Soarism."

One is the "opportunistic Soarism," that will flourish among the mediocrities.

The other is "intellectual Soarism," or "pragmatic Soarism."

This second category includes the intellectuals, the entrepreneurs and other classes of people who, while sometimes not overly appreciative of Soares, reached the conclusion that his victory is inevitable and that it is better to bet on "Soarism," attempting to influence it from within, than to fight it.

It must be stated that this idea is not as idealistic as it sounds. Being a phenomenon that rests on a single person, "Soarism" will tend to sacrifice all doctrines to the political survival of Mario Soares. Increasingly, Soares will do at each turn whatever contributes the most to keeping him at the top: therefore, everything in the "Soarist" movement will depend henceforth on the capability of each group and each individual to support Mario Soares.

In other words: "Soarism" will tend to progressively detach itself from the PS to become, above all, the mirror of Soares' strongest supporters, no matter what their political convictions are.

Proof of that resides in the fact that Mario Soares already wants to be a "national candidate above parties" and not the candidate of the Socialist Party, able to promote a consensus among all Portuguese and to garner votes from all areas of the electorate.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

'QADHDHAFISM,' 'KHOMEYNISM' ACCUSATIONS IN MUSLIM COMMUNITY

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 29 Mar 85 p 34

[Article by Antonio Luis Paralta: "Allah's Cord Is Pulled in Different Directions"]

[Excerpts] The Lisbon mosque, already referred to as one of the largest and best Muslim temples in Europe, is being inaugurated today in the midst of electoral differences.

This mosque is the first Arab monument to be built in Portugal in 7 centuries. It is owned by the Islamic Center of Portugal, an institution especially created to help in the construction of the mosque. About 250,000 contos have already been expended, donated by countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan and Iran in descending order.

In the view of Suleiman Valy Mamede, president of the Islamic Community of Lisbon, this temple is a 20-year-old dream.

However, the process has been far from peaceful, and there are some who accuse Valy Mamede of being obsessed by the idea of inaugurating the mosque during his presidency.

"For us, all this has been happiness and pain, hope and despair at the same time," states Mussa Omar, a surgeon who is a candidate to the president of the community, and for whom the entire ceremony hides propaganda effects. There are electoral differences within the community that have been going on for over a year, when the board presided over by Valy Mamede officially ended its term. There have been three attempts at elections since then, but they always failed because of procedural defects. The next elections should be taking place in the near future.

Valy Mamede promises that he will not run for office. In the midst of these troubles, he is reacting strongly to the accusation that he is mixing community affairs and politics, perhaps because he is an important member of the PSD [Social Democratic Party].

These polemics are also peppered with reciprocal accusations of "Qadhdhafism" and "Khomeynism." Mussa Omar states that "we didn't receive a cent from them." He adds: "But Suleiman cannot say he has not been assisted by Libya and Iran, since only last month a secretary of his board flew to those two countries..."

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

# UNITA'S SAVIMBI WARNS PORTUGAL, KNOWS OF MERCENARIES

## Coutinho-Recruited Mercenaries

Lisbon 0 DIA in Portuguese 16 Mar 85 p 7

[Excerpts] The recent measures adopted by the Portuguese government against RENAMO [Mozambique National Resistance] led Jonas Savimbi, leader of the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], to launch a "serious warning" to Lisbon, stating that Portugal "would create a very serious situation" if it adopted any measures against the representatives of his movement.

In an interview to Ricardo Branco, correspondent of RADIO RENASCENCA in Johannesburg, Savimbi indicated that any strong measure by the Lisbon government would "endanger the approximately 100,000 Portuguese still living in Angola." He added that the UNITA would no longer be able to respect Portuguese interests in the former colony.

The Angolan leader--who was being interviewed by the newsmen in his military headquarters in Jamba, in the southeastern area of Angola--affirmed that he knew, through circles sympathetic to his cause in South Africa, about the threats made against RENAMO representatives, culminating in the government's refusal "to forbid the return of some of them to Portugal." He added that "the Portuguese government would have a lot to lose if it adopted similar measures against the UNITA."

In reference to the positions assumed by the Lisbon government vis-a-vis the conflict in Angola, Savimbi stated that Mario Soares' government has been the "most prudent" of all the governments that came to power in Portugal after the 25th of April [1974] and that Lisbon has the moral obligation to respect the agreement it signed with the UNITA following the Treaty of Alvor.

Savimbi also said that he knows of the existence in Portugal of a large number of UNITA sympathizers who do not agree with the situation in Angola; he added: "It would be a very serious matter if Lisbon ignored this situation."

Moreover, Savimbi mentioned the presence of military in the ranks of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]--sent there by Admiral Rosa Coutinho--and indicated he knew the present commander of these forces,

Col Leitao Fernandes. He stated, however, that a distinction must be made, because if there are some military who are involved in the fighting, there are also many who remain in Luanda and in Dondo, where they only provide training and logistic support.

Savimbi affirmed that if Col Leitao Fernandes has the support of certain Angolan officers, the truth is that there is a certain faction among FAPLA [Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] which does not agree with his presence in Angola, and that this fact does not permit him to do what he wishes to accomplish. "On the other hand," Savimbi added, "the Cubans are rather unhappy about the training provided to Angolan soldiers by the Portuguese military. One must remember that the Cubans are those who offer military equipment to Jose Eduardo dos Santos and who are keeping the MPLA in power. Leitao Fernandes' work will sooner or later end up in disaster."

In conclusion, Savimbi said that "it was the wrong thing to do for the Portuguese to support the MPLA and to send troops to Angola to help the Luanda government."

#### Coutinho's Business Activities

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 15-21 Mar 85 p 5

[Text] Following the 25th of April, one of the most successful businessmen who is achieving increasingly prosperous results is Admiral Rosa Coutinho; he presides over two important export-import firms. We are talking of the "Vesper" and the "Coteco" companies, which specialize in operations with Angola. Recently, the Luanda Fair enjoyed Rosa Coutinho's important cooperation and all the Portuguese firms who showed their products in the Angolan capital had to pay a commission to the former Navy officer known for his adherence to the Portuguese Communist Party. The "Coteco" is a firm that specializes in the recruitment of mercenaries for the Angolan army. As is well known, the UNITA and MPLA both recruit mercenaries in Lisbon, whom they then use in the fratricidal war that is destroying the Angolan homeland. In conclusion: whoever wishes to transact business with Angola must first go to Admiral Rosa Coutinho's office. Here is someone who has benefited from the 25 April 1974 revolution.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

COMMENTS ON PSD'S PERCEIVED LOSS OF CREDIBILITY

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 21 Mar 85 p 5

[Excerpts] Well-placed observers (as it is customary to say in journalistic jargon), affirm that Mario Soares is finding it increasingly difficult to take the PSD [Social Democratic Party] seriously. In the view of the prime minister and secretary general of the PS [Socialist Party], the "solution" found by the social democrats for their political leadership leads nowhere. Lucas Pires already said something like that during one of his speeches: now, when people call the PSD, they don't know who will answer or even what will be said.

Nothing is worse for a party--and especially for a party participating in the government--to see its credibility vis-a-vis its interlocutor undermined. This is increasingly the case with the PSD with each passing day. The "troika" that replaced the leader elected at the congress is, in spite of its frenetic activity--and perhaps because of it--progressively losing the possibility to provide effective leadership for the party.

We do not deny Rui Machete the qualifications to lead the PSD. However, we do believe that, since the leadership in place is a leadership of compromise, between opposites, it will never be able to acquire vis-a-vis its coalition partner the negotiating power needed to impose on it the structural measures both of them agreed to.

More than anything else, and as soon as possible, the PSD needs to find personalized leadership--Mota Pinto or anyone else. Otherwise, its image will irremediably deteriorate, not only in the eyes of the PS, but, what is worse, in the view of its traditional electorate.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

PSD'S MACHETE: INSIGHTS INTO BACKGROUND, FAMILY LIFE

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 22 Mar 85 p 39

[Excerpts] To know, even minimally, the Machete family is pleasant and "inspires envy." The "image" of Dr Rui Machete's family environment is indeed exemplary.

A chemist-physicist, Fernanda Machete, the PSD [Social Democratic Party] leader's wife, was assistant professor at the Lisbon Faculty of Science for more than a decade. She then became a researcher at the Ricardo Jorge Institute lab, and is presently president of the Institute of Support to the Processing and Marketing of Agricultural and Food Products of the Ministry of Agriculture.

The Machetes have three children: Pedro, 19, a student at the Law Faculty of Catholic University; Maria Joao, 18, 12th grade student at the German School, and Miguel, in the 10th grade of the same school.

"Just like my parents and Rui's, the only things we wish and have to leave our children are study, courses, culture and morality, and education," Fernanda states.

Nothing else? No other worldly goods?

"We only own this apartment that we are still paying off to the bank, and we are thinking of purchasing in the future a floor of offices for our children to use for themselves, whatever they decide to do." She adds: "I can assure you that we have no other properties, money or jewels."

Our reporter asked to be allowed to take a photo of the whole family. Oh no, it wasn't possible! First of all, because the "children" would not pose for it. They don't want to be "Rui Machete's children," they wish to be "themselves."

Does the Machete family live in fear, especially from the time that Rui Machete, as minister of justice, unleashed the legal process against the FP-25?

"Fear? No, never. We have a basic Christian philosophy, according to which the most important goal is to reach the end of our lives without remorse. Both for us and for our children, human existence is a transition, a mission. A mission we must carry out as honestly and efficiently as we can. Once this is done, we have no fear of dying. Let God's will be done!"

Fernanda Machete, obviously a very determined woman, admits that deep down, she wishes this phase of her husband's life is transitory. She explains: "I have enough of this! I would like the husband and father to return home. But I recognize he has a mission to accomplish. God put him there, God will protect him."

She admits that, at least in her own view, her husband should not have been a dissident within the PSD, connected to the group that constituted the ASDI [Association of Independent Social Democrats]. At any rate, he did not adhere to this party ("because he soon became aware that the most honest dissidents of the party would never become the most listened to.") However, she believes that Rui Machete always preferred to serve the country and the party than himself.

"In the beginning of the party's life, he refused to become a deputy. He only accepted once. He always preferred a more discreet task. As a result, he is not accustomed to campaigns and has no obligations..."

And now?

"It is the same. Rui was not the one in the middle of the crisis and did not bring it about. Thus, Rui will always be a winner. He belongs to no faction, he is not ambitious. He has nothing to lose. If he leaves his office, he will only gain in terms of personal and family happiness, which is the most important objective for both of us."

Proudly, Fernanda Machete tells us that the children help with household tasks. "We have never had a live-in maid, we only have a woman who comes in a few hours a day."

Twice a week, Dr Rui Machete leaves home before 8 o'clock to play tennis, his favorite sport. He never has lunch at home, but communicates with his wife by phone twice or three times a day. He seldom returns home before 10 o'clock at night. On week-ends, visits to the district committees take him away from his family as well.

"I define Rui as a calm, serene, determined--very determined when necessary, even with his children--man! He is well balanced and very 'mature.' He was like that even at 20, when I was 16 and we started dating. He seemed to me much older than our 4 years' difference. For this and much more, for everything, I don't deny that the country and the PSD need him. But I'd like to tell you that the children and I also do," Fernanda says, while one of the children, the one responsible for the cooking this particular week, interrupts to ask how a rice dish must be cooked and another (Maria Joao), takes away the black cocker spaniel for a walk.

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

SOARES, MIGUEL: REVERSED POSITIONS

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 23 Mar 85 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva: "Two Candidates Upside Down"]

[Text] Everything is being prepared on the Portuguese political scene so that the next presidential elections show a curious exchange of roles between two candidates.

Let's admit that Mario Soares will be a candidate and that the PSD [Social Democratic Party] will select Firmino Miguel.

Now, what would be natural in regard to these two candidacies?

It would be natural for Soares, as the leader of the Socialist Party, to present himself as a candidate with a program close to his party's platform.

In other words: it would be natural for Soares to set as his main objective the implementation of the political plan of his own party. This is, of course, what happened with Mitterrand in France. The reverse would not make sense.

In reality, when a party believes that its program cannot serve as the basis for a presidential candidacy, it must abstain from fielding its leader as a candidate, preferring to opt for an independent.

Let's now examine the Firmino Miguel case.

It would be normal for Firmino, who is a military, to be an independent candidate unconnected to any party platform.

Indeed, the selection of a member of the Armed Forces by a political force is only understandable if it stresses the choice of a man above parties, and therefore able to bring about, not division, but "national unity." Otherwise--that is, if the PSD were interested in a candidate who would implement its own program--it would be more natural for the party to opt for the candidacy of its own leader, or, at least, of one of its militants.

Meanwhile, what is being prepared in Portuguese politics is exactly the opposite.

Mario Soares, secretary general of the Socialist Party, will want to present himself as the candidate of "national consensus"--that is, as a candidate without a concrete program and lacking a definite place on the political spectrum, able to garner votes from all sides and willing to conduct the presidency as an arbiter, without favoring any particular party, much less his own.

As for the PSD, this party wishes that the military personality it selects promises to implement all the changes for which the social democrats are fighting and which they have so far been unable to bring about. Thus, at the end of the year, we shall have two candidates in inverted positions.

One, being the leader of a party, wishes to be a candidate "above parties." The other, being a military man, will be presented as the person who will most adequately respond to the desires of a political party.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

LIBYAN USE OF CASCAIS AIRPORT QUESTIONED

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 23 Mar 85 p 15

[Excerpt] The use of the Tires airport by Libyan entities, especially in connection with nocturnal helicopter flights, is attracting the attention and being analyzed by both civilian and military authorities.

This affair has reportedly been brought to the attention of the Second Division of the Air Force general staff.

The Tires airport, which is owned by the Cascais Municipal Chamber, has been used by a pilot school, the Aerovia, and through it, by means of regularly signed contracts, by Libyan, Spanish, Italian and Ecuadorean entities.

The airport has been used both during the day and at night, and in the Libyan instance, numerous helicopter flights have been noticed.

The authorities which are following this case are especially concerned by the lack of control over the origin or the destination of these flights.

Among other serious deficiencies, the Tires airport lacks any air traffic control, both for incoming or outgoing flights, and has no coordination with the Lisbon airport air traffic control.

The acknowledgement of these and other deficiencies of the Tires airport has led Helena Roseta, president of the Cascais Municipal Chamber, to ask for a technical report on the airport.

According to well-informed sources, the report, which was prepared by a well-known specialist, is very critical of all airport facilities.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

EANES ON MILITARY CANDIDACY--Ramalho Eanes excludes the possibility of giving the nod to a "second" military personality--even if he were fully trusted by him--in the event another officer of high rank accepts to be a candidate for the presidency with partisan support, our newspaper learned from reliable sources. This is due to the fact that the president of the Republic does not wish in any way to foment divisions within the Armed Forces. According to the same sources, Eanes is now reportedly strongly leaning toward a military candidacy. People around him have advocated Firmino Miguel's candidacy, while others prefer Rocha Vieira (like Joaquim Aguiar) or Costa Bras (suggested by Vitor Alves). The president believes that his candidate should be able to attract conservative voters, especially within the PSD [Social Democratic Party] and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party]. Meanwhile, Eanes will publicly clarify his position on the next presidential elections and on the recently created Democratic Renewal Party after the 15th of May, when this party's national convention will take place. [Excerpts] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 23 Mar 85 pp 1, 24]

PCP OFFICIAL ON PINTASILGO CANDIDACY--Communist leader Blanqui Teixeira stated yesterday to the ANOP [PORTUGUESE NEWS AGENCY] in Funchal that the Lourdes Pintasilgo candidacy "is not yet a presidential candidacy of convergence as wished." According to the member of the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] central committee, the "communists want a convergence of opinion about a president of the Republic that would secure votes in all areas, as happened with Gen Ramalho Eanes in 1980." Blanqui Teixeira specified that in the view of the PCP, "it makes no difference whether the candidate is a civilian or a military." In connection with the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party], the communist official stated that "it is a party that will attract votes from all sides," but that the PCP "has no reason to believe that it will draw away a large part of the communist electorate." He added that the PRD "is in its formative stage, because there are many people, besides those who are close to and have voted for the APU [United People's Alliance], who hope in [the] April [revolution] and don't trust the parties in the government." [Excerpt] [Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 28 Mar 85 p 5]

JARDIM: KGB INFILTRATION--The PSD [Social Democratic Party], the PS [Socialist Party] and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] "are infiltrated by the KGB, by Western powers and by pressure groups." This statement was made by Alberto Joao Jardim; according to him, these forces are interested in destabilizing the nation's political life while simultaneously attempting to maintain the present political system to which he is violently opposed. Jardim was being interviewed on the Madeira radio. He stated that the PSD is the major target of destabilization and advocated a "strong" leadership in order to resist "infiltration directed from the outside." Joao Jardim, who withdrew his support and solidarity to the central government, said that relations between the Madeira autonomous region and the officials of the government are "very bad," adding that the next elections will be a "life and death struggle." He stated that "there will be some excesses and the security of some people may be endangered." [Excerpts] [Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 25 Mar 85 p 10]

CSO: 3542/154

POLITICAL

SPAIN

HERRI BATASUNA CRITICAL OF PNV-PSOE ACCORD

San Sebastian EGIN in Spanish 2 Feb 85 p 3

[Text] The pact between PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] and PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] "precludes the potential political means that might exist to enable the Basque people to achieve national sovereignty, which is the aspiration of a vast majority of our people." This was the assessment made by Inaki Ruiz de Pinedo, member of Herri Batasuna [Popular Unity], of the recent pact supported by the present PNV leadership, during the course of a press conference held yesterday in Irunea, at which Yon Idigoras, Inaki Aldekoa and Rafa Diez, all congressmen of the Abertzale [Patriotic] coalition in Nafarroa and Vascongadas, were present.

In the first place, Idigoras cited the fact that the press conference was held in Nafarroa "because, to Herri Batasuna and for the Basque people's sovereignty" Nafarroa is the most important place, especially when we are going to discuss the issue of the historical importance to the Basque people of the recent signing of the so-called legislative pact between PSOE and the PNV leadership." He also noted that HB is at present "the only force that is clearly dissociated from the contents of this pact."

The assessment by these four elected officials of HB related mainly to the significance that this pact would have for the sovereignty of the Basque people and for the future of the working class. Ruiz de Pinedo was the first to start this evaluation, remarking that this was HB's first public statement regarding the PNV-PSOE pact, and that since the Statute of Gernika, this pact is a political step that defines and quite clearly brings out the political intentions of "the various PNV leaders."

In his address, Ruiz de Pinedo concentrated on the part of the pact relating to violence, claiming that it was a document very well thought out and discussed by the executive bodies of both parties, and that "it will also have the approval of groups with a great deal of force in political activity which have not appeared as parties." In that connection, he criticized the reference made in the pact to the "state of law" and its connection with the "battle against terrorism and violence, as well as the causes prompting them"; claiming that there is an attempt to identify the present status of Euskadi with a state of law.

He declared: "In Southern Euskadi, a number of cases of torture have appeared; there have been illegalities associated with the police forces defending the independence movement, and the demands for the right to national sovereignty have no institutional channels for succeeding. In addition, there are many things not included in the text of the pact, and one of them is that it does not mention the right to self-determination; because it will not take the step of recognizing that right. It does say that they will put an end to the causes of violence among these people, and the political means whereby these people could attain national sovereignty are not set forth. This means that their political maneuver is nothing more than an attempt to pester us labor and popular sectors who uphold national sovereignty for Euskadi. This text does not talk about achieving peaceful, political, institutional means to enable the Basque people to achieve self-determination, which is where the fundamental origin of the popular violence existing in Euskadi lies. This pact is an obvious threat to the independent sectors and all those calling for our people's right to self-determination."

#### The Pact Implicates the Two Governments

Inaki Aldekoa, for his part, claimed that this is not a pact limited to the Vascongadas government and the Socialist group in the Gasteiz parliament. He said: "The persistence with which this has been said and the care with which the text has been written in all its formal respects, on this matter, are more than suspicious. It is obvious that the pact goes far beyond the Vascongadas government and the Socialist group. This pact implicates the PNV leadership and, moreover, the PSOE, or state government." In this connection, he cited the "slip" that exists in the text written for the pact, in which it states: "They agree to solve by means of dialogue and negotiation any conflicts of authority that may arise between the two governments." According to Aldekoa, this reference to "the two governments" reveals that the pact implicates both of them alike.

He added: "But the PNV-PSOE pact is something more. It is an agreement between the de facto pressure groups which these political parties really represent. In other words, on the part of the PNV leadership with the bourgeois sectors of Vascongadas, and on the part of PSOE with the de facto sectors, essentially the military authorities and other forces of the Francoist police apparatus and the financial oligarchy."

Inaki Aldekoa also noted that the reaction has been so strong among the PNV rank and file that, during the past few days, there has been a "certain turnabout," a "certain withdrawal" regarding the pact on the part of those who have signed it. According to Aldekoa, the one who gains from this pact is PSOE, and "it is rather incomprehensible how, in a state of progressive PSOE weakness in Vascongadas, PNV has signed this pact which gives PSOE an image of strength." After asserting that PNV has, in this way, ended up "finally settling the dispute about the territorial unity of Euskal Herria," he asked what the PNV leadership has obtained in exchange for the "obvious concessions" made by it to PSOE. According to Aldekoa, the one really benefiting is "a sector of the

Vascongadas bourgeoisie" reportedly represented by Garcia Egocheaga, who has been appointed "vice lehendakari" of the Ardanza government. In the view of the HB leader, the issues on which compensations has been given are those relating to the pending transfers, industrial reconversion and entry into the EEC; and with regard to the first point he said: "For these sectors, which have never been patriotic, and which can only be described as moderate autonomists, these pending transfers seem more than sufficient."

Aldekoa explained: "PNV made this radical change a few months ago, because there were already great doubts about whether the expedient of the Statute of Moncloa was the solution to this country's problems, and in this way they have now gained 1 or 2 years over the party's rank and file in trying to convince people that a solution is still possible." Finally, he said that the pact "exudes an odor of humiliating share and submission," after citing another point in the PNV-PSOE pact in which it claims "the Basque people democratically decided, by means of a referendum, to opt for the statute when it was time to give a response to the demand for self-government." In this connection, Aldekoa gave a reminder that, "There are many tens of thousands of people comprising part of the Basque nation who did not even have a chance to opt for that statute or not, including the Navarrans and all those from Iparralde."

#### The Betrayal of the Basque People Will Not Be Consummated

For his part, and to explain the PNV-PSOE pact, Yon Idigoras cited its similarity to the pact made by the crow and the vulture when they see an animal that they think is dead. "The crow is the one responsible for removing the eyes, to help the vulture eat the rest of the carcass. The vulture is PSOE, with all the oligarchical power, and the pathetic role of the crow has been assigned to Mr Ardanza and to PNV's technocratic, bureaucratic leadership. But I think that both are mistaken; in other words, they have made a pact that will be very difficult to put into practice later; because the animal is not dead and neither of the two can begin this feast. And I say that it is not dead because there is in this country, fortunately for the country and unfortunately for these carrion creatures, a sizable opposition, a reference point which at present is Herri Batasuna, not only for the sectors which have been members of HB or have voted for HB, but also for thousands upon thousands of Basques from PNV itself."

According to Idigoras, this opposition is what will preclude the consummation of "this flagrant backing down, this dropping of the pants and this betrayal of the Basque people." With regard to the pact, he said that it was not a certain pact, but rather "a subjugation of the self-interested PNV leadership to PSOE and to the oligarchical state authorities." He remarked: "It has been realized that the process of the statute has succumbed to a blind alley but, rather than correcting its failures or its weaknesses, the PNV leadership, disregarding the desires of all those votes that it won in the previous elections, has chosen to make the pact of the crow with the vulture; in other words, to totally subject itself in a shameful and humiliating manner, trying to sell the interests and the future of this Basque people. At the present time, the

PNV leadership, which previously rejected the Spanish Constitution, is implicitly and explicitly abiding by the Constitution and its entire content. This is a pact marked by weakness and frustration, which even the large majority of the party's Nationalist rank and file will not heed and which therefore is doomed to the most complete failure."

#### Free Rein to Big Financial Capital

The last to speak was Rafa Diez, who commented on the economic portion of the PNV-PSOE pact, dwelling on the remarks delivered by Idigoras to the effect that the pact "also attempts to be the cover in Euskadi for all the oligarchical measures of the international financial system, which are hostile to the working class and which have materialized in brutal reconversions and massive layoffs."

According to Rafa Diez, the references made in the pact to economic matters have been continued with the composition of the Ardanza cabinet, noting that this means "giving free rein to the economic policy of big financial and industrial capital," and that it is "a manifestation of the type of interests that PNV and PSOE have been defending, legitimizing and concealing."

He added: "This will imply that, from now on, PSOE, PNV, the business owners, the National Police, the Ertzantza and, perhaps very soon, ELA [Basque Workers Solidarity] and UGT [General Union of Workers], as trade union movements which are influenced by PNV and PSOE, will be confronted in a joint, combined manner, by thousands of workers, backing an economic policy that only seeks to make profits for sectors and business firms on the backs of the workers, unemployment, alienation and poverty. Through this pact, PNV has become a new catalyzing tool for fulfilling the plans of the central government, for fulfilling the suprapstate plans, through possible integration into EEC."

Among other things, Rafa Diez declared that, with this pact, "there is no possibility of self-government in the economic realm," and that it is not by chance that, as a result of this pact, "Mr Ardanza has selected or has had imposed on him a super-economic adviser such as Mr Garcia Egocheaga, a man known for the purging of business firms with the clean system of unemployed workers, with repression; a man who enjoys the total confidence of big Spanish management."

#### The Causes

The fact that it refers to revolutionary violence is one of the features of the pact that has drawn the most attention, although some PNV members are privately attempting to detract importance from it, saying that it does not add very much to the previous situation. There is some truth in this assertion, because the PNV leadership has always opposed revolutionary violence, even during Franco's time.

Hence, it is unfair to accuse it of being an accomplice of "terrorism," either previously or now. Nevertheless, the differences between this party and the

others with status have been present when the time came to assess "the causes generating it," wherein there might have been a certain amount of historical understanding of it on the part of PNV, which has now disappeared, because of the necessity for realism. Oddly enough, it is this reason that has been forcing them to accept what they never would have during the dictator's life: Then, even Saint Thomas would have justified the armed response to the oppression.

2909

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

# PNV'S DOCUMENT REVEALS SPLIT AMONG NATIONALIST RANKS

Madrid ABC in Spanish 7 Feb 85 p 15

[Article by special correspondent Jose Antonio A. Gundin]

[Text] Bilbao--The Basque Nationalist Party [PNV] is willing to exercise "the right to self-determination, with a proposal for independence, if the defense of the Basque identity so demands." This comment was made in the latest document prepared by PNV's top-ranking organ, Euskadi Buru Batzar [EBB-Basque Executive Committee of PNV]. The document in question is dated 30 January, and is signed by the then head of the entity, Roman Sodupe; and it is demarcated, in sections, from the legislative pact.

By way of a defense against the internal criticism from the Garaicoechea sector, the document prepared by the PNV executive body gives a reminder of Sabino Arana's fundamental propositions. "EBB accepts and upholds Sabino Arana's principle of defending the identity of the Basque people until the final consequences, and it reaffirms itself as a trustee and defender of his entire legacy."

The document adds: "To develop this objective in a practical way, Arana applied to it the principle of nationalities which the 19th century political theory provided to him: To state it in a clear, succinct manner, this principle, which is still in effect, led to the conclusion that the Basque people, as such, were entitled to defend their independence."

EBB subsequently states that this defense of the Basque people's identity and of the assumption of political power to put it into effect should be geared to the times and the circumstances, "without waiving anything, but without succumbing to the paralysis of formulations."

"The right of self-determination of peoples is a political formulation that has already been established, not only in theory, but also in international pacts that have considered this right something inherent and inalienable for peoples."

It expresses the fear that "We Basques may arrive too late at the formulations of European nationalism, and it would be sad if we were to lack the political insight necessary to enable us to attain new theoretical and practical proposals in time."

The document adds: "If the defense of the Basque people's identity should dictate or demand of our people under certain circumstances the exercise of the right of self-determination, with a proposal for independence, it should be made clear that PNV, a political force which has assumed the defense of that identity as a priority objective, will not hesitate to assume that responsibility."

Then the document notes that, whereas all that has been stated related to the realm of principles, "in that of current reality, the facts show that part of this Basque people is contained within the Spanish state, and possessing a statute of autonomy, with the limitations, rights and responsibilities that such a situation entails."

The internal statement points out: "This EBB is of the opinion that, in this situation, we must be completely consistent, and accept both the good and the bad, fleeing from a policy of testimonial gestures and demagoguery associated with Monzon."

With regard to the "lendakari," Ardanza states: "We have asked him to be merely consistent with the legal status in which we find ourselves, and that his work, his concerns and his struggle take place in the realm of precise action, to improve the conditions of the people that he is going to govern."

EBB remarks that he must not forget that the "lendakari" must be president of all Basques: "Accepting that task under the present circumstances could entail ideological efforts for a nationalist at heart, as all the members of that party are, including the 'lendakari' himself."

The criticism evoked by the appointment of Jose Antonio Ardanza as "lendakari" in the PNV and PSOE has been intense, and of such a kind that the top-ranking organ of the PNV party has been forced to deal with it. "This EBB feels deeply concerned about the behavior of certain internal sectors of the party which, for obvious reasons, are concealing and falsifying the facts."

In Nationalist circles this paragraph has been interpreted as a direct attack upon the Garaicoechea sector. These circles have commented: "this is one of the most severe criticism made to date in that high-ranking PNV agency against the sympathizers of Carlos Garaicoechea."

The document concludes with another condemnation of "the disgraceful manipulations that are occurring," and "discredits as responsible Nationalists those who, for their own benefit, without a sense of responsibility and without a vision of the future, have embarked on an absurd campaign from which they are attempting to procure acknowledgment of being more Nationalistic than others, without arguments other than falsehoods and slander."

2909

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23 April 1985

POLITICAL

TURKEY

## ISLAMIC REVIVAL MOVEMENT QUESTIONED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 13 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Professor Dr Suna Kili, lecturer at Bogazici University: "Is Turkey a Republic or an Islamic Republic?"]

[Text] The foremost feature and mainstay of the Turkish Republic is that this state is a secular, democratic, national and social civil state. It was this supreme and immutable feature that distinguished the Turkish Republic from the government of the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottoman blend of "caliph-sultan" gave organization to a religious regime. The "sultan" was head of state of all nations of the empire and, in his capacity as "caliph," was the protector and religious leader of all the world's Muslims.

The Turkish Republic, however, was the direct opposite of this, adopting a national state -- the Turkish state -- a secular order and a method of government born of a national will. All laws, rules, organizations and practices in all matters in this order of state and society that was adopted and framed in a constitution must be secular, national and democratic. Not only that, but every action, every attitude, every decision and practice in this order was to gain its validity through compliance with the law under the principle of supremacy of the law. No person, class or group in this order is superior to the law, regardless of any economic, political, religious, social, traditional or any other source from which it may derive its power.

Under the Ottomans, validity started at the top with the desires, commands and powers of the "caliph-sultan" and passed downward to individuals and their leaders, the progress in religion being creed, sect, order and in economic, social and traditional matters, "aga," bey," "sheriff."

The goal of the Turkish Republic is a modern state, modern society; under the Ottomans the state and society were both religious and traditional.

To sum up, let us stress: The present and future of the Turkish nation, the Turkish Republic, are vested in the commitment at the foundation of its existence to being national, secular, democratic and civil and in the continuity of this commitment.

## Opposing Developments

Despite this legal and vital imperative, there has been in recent years and especially now a steadily growing body of so-called scholarly, but in fact political and ideological, pseudo-research on the Ottomans, both at home and abroad, in an effort to give the Ottomans and things Ottoman respectability and cause for acclaim.

At the heart of this Ottoman and things-Ottoman movement lie Islam, the Muslim Turkish state and the order of Muslim states. The "Islamic-Turkish synthesis" being discussed so often today is an ideology stemming from reconciling the "ethnic nationalism" of Ziya Gokalp with Mehmet Akif's "Islamic nationalism" and which attempts to popularize and render it dominant in society and the state. This ideology is both opposed to Atatürkist thought and harmful to Turkey and the future of the Turkish nation.

## Atatürk's Attitude

Atatürk plainly said, leaving no room for debate of his thought and attitude:

"The policy of the Ottoman state is not national, but personal, turgid and irresolute..."

"History will not allow the policy of Islamism and Pan-Turanism to gain success and take over the world..."

"The political method that we consider enlightened and applicable is 'national policy.' Nothing can be so wrong as to be oblivious to the general circumstances of the world today and to the realities that centuries have implanted in minds and thoughts. This is what history tells us; this is what science, wisdom and logic tell us..."

"What I wish to convey in saying 'national policy' is this: To preserve our existence within our national boundaries based first of all on our own strength and to work for the true happiness and prosperity of the nation and the country; to refrain from sending the nation in haphazard pursuit of unattainable desires and causing it harm; to expect civilized and humanitarian behavior and mutual friendship from the civilized world."<sup>1</sup>

Atatürk further stressed one fact: "To have friends, to protect our complete independence, to consider everything in a Turkish light. This is the realistic view, the reaction to the ideology that was the downfall of the Ottoman Empire."<sup>2</sup>

As opposed to this straightforward attitude of Atatürk's and the laws of the Turkish Republic stemming from this attitude and thought, efforts abound in our country today to convert into official ideology the "Muslim-Turkish synthesis" that arises from the forced reconciliation of "Pan-Turanist" and "Pan-Islamist" thought. In conjunction with this, anti-Atatürkism is being injected into most of the courses and centers that go by the name of religious education, and the special dress, traditions, ceremonies and rites of the creeds, sects and hierarchies of the Ottoman order are being practiced.

This development is filled with risks from the standpoint of our national interests from all directions, near and far.

In a society that has not yet fully succeeded at shedding the sense of religious community for a sense of common citizenship, putting Turkishness before Islamicness as the prime characteristic, and bringing the existence and continuity of Turkishness to the quintessential state, to go knocking on the doors of ideologies such as "Muslim-Turkish synthesis" has no meaning other than the desire and determination to convert the Turkish Republic into either an "Ottoman Republic" or a "Turkish Islamic Republic." And this benefits, not the Turks, but the policies of foreigners, of the states whose interests clash over the Middle East.

The question that may come to mind at this stage is this:

Did the Turks fight the war for national liberation and independence in order to prolong the life of the Ottoman state and the Ottoman dynasty, or was it to establish the national, secular, democratic, social and civil Turkish state, the Turkish Republic?

Again, the founder of the Turkish Republic, Ataturk, has the answer to this question:

"Sovereignty and dominion cannot be bestowed by anyone upon anyone through discussion or debate as a fact of life. Sovereignty and dominion are taken by force, by might, by strength. The Ottomans seized the sovereignty and dominion of the Turkish nation by force and perpetuated it down through the ages. Now, the Turkish nation has seized the offensive, revolted and taken its sovereignty and dominion directly into its own hands."<sup>3</sup>

"...Those who are now engaged in agitating and deceiving Islamic society with a plan for a caliphate are purely and simply the enemy of Islamic society and especially of Turkey. To fall for such a ploy can only be a sign of ignorance and recklessness."<sup>4</sup>

"...My own poor body will certainly one day return to the earth. But the Turkish Republic will last forever and the Turkish nation will continue its unswerving march towards civilization under the principles that guarantee security and happiness."<sup>5</sup>

Thus, all patriots and Ataturkists must fight to rend asunder the veil of silence before this development, influence and impetus against the secular, democratic, social and civil Turkish Republic and to preserve the Republic of Ataturk until eternity. This is both our duty and the requirement for guaranteeing our future as a state, as a nation and as individuals.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Ataturk, "Nutuk, II," Istanbul, Milli Egitim Publishers, 1962, pp 435-437.
2. Enver Ziya Karal, "Ataturk'ten Dusunceler," Ankara, Turkish Historical Association Publishers, 1956, p 122.
3. "Nutuk," pp 690-691.
4. Ibid, p 851.
5. HAKIMIYETI MILLIYE, 19 May 1926.

8349

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

OZAL ON PARTY PROSPECTS, FOREIGN RELATIONS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 13 Mar 85 p 7

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET BUREAU) - Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, noting that speculation on the ANAP [Motherland Party] was increasing as the Grand Congress nears, said, "We are completely outside the old lines. There is not one among us who is after personal interests." Ozal declared that he was "happy" with his "working colleagues now" and said, "We will come out of the congress much stronger."

Prime Minister Ozal spoke to the ANAP group, which met yesterday, to discuss the trips he will be making abroad. He then mentioned internal ANAP developments, saying:

"Various rumors are circulating about the party as the Grand Congress nears. Speculations are growing. Let no one doubt that ANAP has an organization unlike any other party organization. We are not the extension of any former party and we are completely outside the old lines. No matter what anyone says, there is no alternative to us at the moment.

"We may have problems. No country in the world is without problems, even the richest ones. We have had very good results in the past years."

Ozal said that, after going to Moscow for Chernenko's funeral, he would be going to Saudi Arabia and then start a trip to the United States. On the visit to Turkey by the emir of Qatar, he said:

"We had extremely important talks with the emir of Qatar. We will continue having talks of this kind within the framework of close relations with the Arab nations. Our close relations with Arab countries will have a direct and positive effect on our relations with Western nations."

Prime Minister Ozal said that Turkey had undergone great changes in recent years and that its foreign reserves had increased more than \$1 billion over last year.

Attributing the main cause of certain shortages to the great change in the country, Ozal concluded his remarks as follows:

"We have to make these changes quickly. That is my experience. No program has managed to be applied for long in our country.

"Sustaining this program with no compromise is a must. So, if we are going to accomplish anything in Turkey, we will have to do it quickly."

POLITICAL

TURKEY

# OZAL CALLS FOR DIALOGUE WITH PAPANDREOU, BULGARIA

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 13 Mar 85 pp 3, 8

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET BUREAU) - Prime Minister Turgut Ozal hosted a luncheon yesterday at the Bulvar Palas [hotel] for foreign journalists also assigned to Athens. In the speech he made at the luncheon, Ozal said he was proposing wide-ranging negotiations to the Greek leader. "We are ready to participate in these talks anywhere, any time, at any level. I want to make it clear that I am ready for plain talk on all topics with the Greek prime minister," he said. Ozal also asserted that the Turkish people had never put a premium on artificial hostilities, continuing: "Regardless of what the internal developments may be, therefore, they must not constitute an obstacle to the initiation of Turkish-Greek dialogue."

In noting that Turkey has made great strides in restoring democracy, that it shares the same values as the West in this regard and is committed to human rights and the basic freedoms, Ozal asserted that the government's economic policies were consistent with the free market policies of the West.

The prime minister said that he believed Turkey's current disagreements with one or two West European nations would soon be resolved and, in reference to Bulgarian-Turkish relations, said:

"I would like to point out that we greet with great anxiety the measures taken by Bulgaria for the Bulgarization of the Muslim Turkish minority. Though preserving a responsible course of action, we will never cease to expend every effort to enable the Muslim Turks in Bulgaria to enjoy all minority rights as envisaged in international law and bilateral and multilateral agreements. It is important to us that all problems between us and our neighbor Bulgaria be resolved through dialogue and common sense."

Ozal pointed out that the Greek prime minister had set as a prerequisite to the rectification of Turkish-Greek relations a solution to the Cyprus problem and said:

"I must point out that I am having difficulty understanding this logic. It is putting the cart before the horse, because, while insisting that the Cyprus problem has priority, the Greeks nonetheless wanted their Greek Cypriot friends to reject the UN secretary general's proposals. The reaction of the Greek Cypriot parliament to the Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders' behavior is proof of this."

"Naturally, I do not want to imply that there is no connection between these two matters. On the contrary, I believe that when Turkey and Greece begin a dialogue on the important matters between them, especially the Aegean, and when they have made substantial progress in this matter, they will undoubtedly have created an atmosphere of mutual trust in the direction of a final solution as regards Cyprus also.

"If Cyprus was able to emerge as an independent state in 1960, it was because of the good relations at that time between Turkey and Greece.

"As for today, can you expect the Turkish and Greek communities on Cyprus to trust each other when the leaders of the two mother countries are not even shaking hands with each other?"

Ozal continued:

"We have shown on numerous occasions that all we are after is peace and cooperation. We have no designs on even one square inch of Greek territory. However, Turkey's pro-peace stance must not be misunderstood. Turkey is determined to preserve its lawful rights and interests and will oppose any kind of fait accompli.

"The Turkish and Greek nations want peace, they want cooperation and they want peace to grow and flourish. We cannot, as responsible politicians, remain deaf to these desires of our people.

"Now I am proposing here to the Greek leader wide-ranging negotiations. We are ready for these negotiations anywhere, any time, at any level. I want to say that I am ready for plain talk on every topic with the Greek prime minister."

8349

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MILITARY

CANADA

## DEFENSE SPENDING, TROOP INCREASE FOR NATO FORCES ANNOUNCED

### Arms Spending Up

Vancouver THE SUN in English 27 Feb 85 p B1

[Article by John Cairns]

[Text]

OTTAWA — Canadian defence spending will increase by seven per cent, reaching \$9.4 billion, in the fiscal year beginning April 1.

Although that is one of the largest spending increases included in 1985-86 spending estimates tabled Tuesday in the House of Commons, the government was quick to congratulate itself for thriftiness. A government review reduced growth in defence spending, according to a statement prepared for Treasury Board president Robert de Cotret.

Nuclear attack is the main threat to Canadian security, according to documentation released with the defence estimates. "As long as there remains no real defence against such an attack, Canada must seek security in preventing such an attack from occurring," the documents said.

"Until this can be assured by means of mutual arms control and disarmament arrangements, there is no choice but to follow the route of deterrence."

Therefore, it is necessary to help the United States maintain credible "retaliatory capability — the essence of deterrence," the documents said. That includes contributing to an early warning system.

Much of the \$616 million increase in defence estimates is devoted to more modern equipment. That is consistent with NATO's goal of three-per-cent increases in real defence spending,

the government argues. The government claims it is trying to increase Canada's ability to meet existing NATO requirements, not create new ones.

The 1984-85 estimate for Canadian defence spending was \$8.8 billion. The defence services program plans to add 693 military personnel in 1985-86 while decreasing civilian personnel strength by 1,121 person-years. The cost of the adjustment is estimated at \$17.3 million.

An additional \$43 million will be spent to increase the readiness of combat forces. Twenty-seven per cent of the defence budget will be spent to acquire major pieces of equipment such as CF-18 fighter aircraft and Canadian patrol frigates.

Major defence projects include construction of two new buildings, one for Maritime Command in Halifax and another for Air Command Headquarters in Winnipeg. The cost next year will be \$8 million and \$14.2 million respectively.

Other anticipated expenses include \$468 million for warship construction, \$43.9 million for purchase of trucks, \$741 million for new fighter aircraft, \$19.2 million for destroyer improvements and \$59.2 million for purchase of Dash-8 Aircraft.

Statistics for 1984 show Canada spending 10 per cent of its budget on defence, well below the NATO average. That compares to 29 per cent in United States, 23 per cent in Ger-

many, 21 per cent in Turkey, 19 per cent in Greece and 18.6 per cent in France.

Less than one per cent of the Canadian workforce is in the armed forces, well below the American total of two per cent.

#### Troop Increase for NATO

LD120035 Montreal International Service in English 2000 GMT 11 Mar 85

[Text] The Canadian Government has announced it will send an additional 1,200 troops to Europe to join the existing 5,900-man complement already there. The announcement was made by both the defense minister, Erik Nielsen, [and] the external affairs minister, Joe Clark. The two ministers described the move as the first early step toward meeting Canada's commitments in Europe to the NATO allies. Mr Nielsen, who was named defense minister just 2 weeks ago, said the extra military personnel will begin arriving in Europe this summer and all will be in place by the summer of 1986. The announcement followed a luncheon meeting between Canadian officials and ambassadors from NATO members.

The proposal from the party leadership for collaboration with the PSP and the PPR met with hardly any opposition at the congress. The debates on other points on the agenda were also far from heated. Apart from the debate on DE WAARHEID, which as usual had to suffer criticism for its independent editorial policy, there was hardly any unseemly language at the CPN congress. The CPN was licking the wounds inflicted by the two previous congresses, in November 1982 and February 1984. The party's unity was seriously upset by these two congresses, at which shape was given to the "renewal" movement. The party's organizational effectiveness was also affected by this.

Peace had to be restored at last weekend's congress. What was really the most important thing was how the new party executive to be elected would look. The candidacy committee -- primarily intended in the past to steer the congress in the direction wished by the party leadership -- had selected a list of nominations and carefully steered a course between the remaining factions in the CPN. Both the few remaining radical renewers, who are striving for a fusion with PSP and the PPR, and Communists from Groningen who are trying to defend the party as the bulwark of classical communism, were nominated by the committee for posts in the new party leadership. In the end, the congress more or less dropped both factions.

There was some commotion prior to the election of the party executive, because delegates were forced to vote for at least 40 candidates. Representatives of the Amsterdam party district in particular considered this to be unfair. According to them they would be forced under such rules to elect to the party executive comrades who in their eyes were incapable. If the right to vote was an issue in the party a couple of years ago, since the "renewal" the right not to vote has become a reason for disagreement. However, in the absence of democratic statutes this controversy could not be kept going for long.

In the new party leadership executive chairman Elli Izeboud's leading position is no longer so automatic. Second Chamber Deputy Marius Ernsting's star in particular is

rising. He was elected to the new 46-man executive with the largest number of votes, more than his parliamentary colleagues Ina Brouwer, Evelien Eshuis, and current executive members such as Izeboud, Secretary John Geelen, and International Secretary Ton van Hoek. "When the party is under pressure the people who still want to make something of it have to foot the bill," was John Geelen's explanation of this.

Elli Izeboud is still "in with a chance" for the post of CPN chairman. The full party executive will reach the decision on this. It will soon elect from its numbers an executive committee.

However, there were immediate rumors at yesterday's congress that Ernsting could have ambitions for the chairmanship, but he himself denied these most strongly.

The old party executive was able to steer all its proposals through the congress without any problems. Only on one point did the congress depart from the views of the leadership. It voted by a small majority in favor of giving foreigners the right to vote in elections to the Second Chamber and to provincial assemblies. The executive had wanted to prevent this. Even the fiery speech by former Chamber Deputy Marcus Bakker, an opponent of the proposal, was to no avail. The CPN, Bakker said, is a "national party." Foreigners who do not want to take Netherlands citizenship should not be allowed to vote for the country's government. "This has nothing to do with the political rights to which foreigners are entitled," Bakker said. However, the congress finally voted in favor of the view of the minority on the party executive, which was supporting voting rights. "Who is more loyal to the Netherlands: Minister Van den Broek, who supports the deployment of U.S. cruise missiles, or this Turkish worker who fights alongside his Netherlands comrade against this deployment?" This was the rhetorical question which party executive member Anne de Boer put successfully to the congress.

CSO: 5220/02

MILITARY

CANADA

## ACTIVISTS OPPOSE U.S. CRUISE MISSILE TESTS

### Supreme Court Approval

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 19 Feb 85 pp 1-2

#### [Excerpts]

OTTAWA (CP) — The Supreme Court of Canada refused yesterday to block U.S. cruise missile tests scheduled for today in a corridor over northwestern Canada.

A five-judge panel heard 90 minutes of argument, then rejected without reasons a request by Operation Dismantle for an injunction to halt the tests until the court rules on an appeal heard a year ago.

James Stark, president of the disarmament group, said in an interview later that efforts by peace groups will continue.

The group announced last Thursday that it would seek an injunction to block the first "free flight" test of the cruise in Canada. At that time, it expected the test would take place next month.

But the Defence Department announced the earlier date on Sunday and Operation Dismantle moved quickly to have its application heard by the court.

There have been two previous tests of the unarmed but nuclear-capable missile over the same cor-

ridor — last March 6 and on Jan. 15 of this year. In both cases they were tethered to a B-52 bomber and both tests went smoothly.

Disarmament groups, caught off guard by the Defence Department's short notice for today's test, began scrambling to organize demonstrations. One protest march will be at Grand Centre, a northeastern Alberta town near Canadian Forces Base Cold Lake, the missile's destination in today's tests.

Gordon Henderson, representing Operation Dismantle, emphasized the risks of the free-flight test to residents along the thinly populated corridor and to peace if the missile should accidentally stray into Soviet air space.

Operation Dismantle's suggestion that an accident could trigger a nuclear war was dismissed by federal lawyer Ian Binnie. He said publicity ensures that people in the Soviet Union know when and where the test is taking place. If a missile did stray, it would be treated as an accident, he argued.

### 19 February Test

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 20 Feb 85 pp 1-2

#### [Article by Robert Sheppard]

#### [Excerpts]

COLD LAKE, Alta. — Military officials are predicting further tests of the U.S. cruise missile in northern Canada after yesterday's successful solo flight in which the stubby projectile bashed easily through

a barrage of Greenpeace protest balloons at low altitude.

The first solo voyage of the jet-powered missile ended "properly," military officials said, with the 3,000-pound cruise parachuting serenely down on top of a frozen Primrose Lake as planned.

Canadian and U.S. military spokesmen said they took no notice of the Greenpeace protest near the end of the test route, but activists with the Vancouver-based environmental group said they were "freaked out" when the missile slid through their grouping of 23 weather balloons tethered about 150 metres above the ground.

It was the third time the controversial missile has flown through a Canadian test corridor — the first two strapped for safety reasons to the wings of a giant bomber.

The general success of the mission and the ease with which it passed the Greenpeace interference tactics without altering course likely opens the door for a further series of tests next year, military officials said.

Although it was tracked both fore and aft by two electronically sophisticated chase planes, the low-flying, unarmed missile was able to negotiate the 2,600-kilometre run from a point over the Beaufort Sea, where it was released from a B-52 bomber, to the northern Alberta weapons range under its own steam in less than four hours.

Arriving at the Primrose range, the \$4-million weapon practiced its still-classified bombing run before military cameras, then climbed to a higher altitude where it deployed a 70-foot parachute and swung gracefully to the ground under the watchful eyes of a 12-member recovery team.

A resident of Inuvik in the Northwest Territories called a government office to report hearing the missile, about the size of a small plane but flying at about 800 kilometres an hour. But the first reported sighting by non-military Canadians was by the group of about 20 Greenpeace activists and sympathizers who hoisted a fish net about 60 metres off the ground along with the higher barrage of weather balloons.

Military officials at Cold Lake said the radar planes accompanying the cruise did not detect the Greenpeace efforts. The RCMP said the stunt went off without significant incident and there were no warnings or arrests.

About 50 members of various disarmament groups, most arriving from Edmonton about 290 kilometres to the southwest, marched to the perimeter of Canadian Forces Base Cold Lake after the flight, handing out leaflets before dispersing after about 20 minutes.

CSO: 5220/02

MILITARY

CANADA

BRIEFS

GREENPEACE VOW--Calgary (CP)--The Greenpeace Foundation, thwarted in its efforts to disrupt recent cruise missile tests, says that next year it will try to electronically jam the missile's radar system. There have been three tests of the air-launched missile this year, the latest one Monday, over northwestern Canada. [Text] [Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 27 Feb 85 p A16]

CSO: 5220/02

MILITARY

GREECE

## MILITARY PROMOTIONS, RETIREMENTS CAUSE CONCERN

### Generals' Promotions, Retirements

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 15 Mar 85 p 1

/Excerpt/ Yesterday the Supreme Military Council /ASS/ retired 35 more high-ranking officers while it promoted 47. Specifically, the ASS decided the following army brigadier generals successfully completed their military careers: Combat status: Theod. Loukidis, Men. Afendris, Dim. Khatzigrigoriou, Khristos Karandinos, Ap. Tsitsikas, Pan. Kostopoulos, Ath. Koutsodimitropoulos, Mikh. Koiegos, Dim. Goulis, Evrysthenis Papaspyron, Perecles Korkontzelos, Ioan. Botas. Various corps: Dimitrios Konitsis, Georgios Kondoravdis, Spyridon Flessas, Kosmas Glavas, and Georgios Tsakiris.

#### Promotions

The ASS also decided to promote on merit to the rank of major general to fill the positions vacated by the aforementioned retired officers the following brigadier generals: Combat status: And. Maranganis, Timol. Vaitas, Kon. Makris, Ev. Prassas, Kon. Kotsidis, Khr. Terzakis, Nik. Kallias, Kon. Froussos, and Dim. Skavrelis.

Various corps: Nik. Perivolos, Vas. Fengos, Khar. Giannopoulos, Ioan. Kharamberidis, Io. Konsolakis, Athan. Argyropoulos, G. Kevrekidis, Menelaos Tsakalos, Nik. Faloutsos, and Dimos Lagoudakis.

#### Air Force Changes

The ASS placed the following brigadier generals on the retirement list for having successfully completed their careers after promoting them the rank of major general: Flight status: Emmanouil Romanos, Ilias Georgiou, Ilias Masouras. Supply Corps: Vasilios Laourdis. Administrative Corps: Filippos Gerolymos. Medical Corps: Paraskevas Kalogeorgas.

#### Retirements Continue

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 16 Mar 85 pp 1, 3

/Text/ Yesterday's action by the ASS to retire many senior officers--in addition to those of 2 days ago and those of last December--has worsened the

charged political atmosphere as well as the fears and speculations of the people. Reliable military circles have characterized these retirements as "a massacre" and pointed out that they took place at a time when the Army is short of officers.

The retirements of 15 more brigadier generals and 110 colonels and promotions of 52 colonels to brigadier generals were announced yesterday. Since last December a total of 49 brigadier generals have been retired, an unprecedented number indeed and outside the margins of normal renewal of military cadres. What is certain is that these retirements either express the government's displeasure toward certain officers or its intention to have complete control of the Armed Forces. Whatever the reason, the present clouded situation is becoming worse while the organization and fighting ability of these forces is being harmed.

#### Retirements and Promotions

The Supreme Evaluation Board /ASK/ decided to retire with the rank of major general the following brigadier generals: Dim. Tsotsis, Ev. Tsakirakis, Kyr. Karagiorgos, Panag. Nalpandis, El. Zidros, An. Markatselas, Ath. Konstandinidis, V. Petropoulos, Kh. Sakellaris, Pan. Khloros, Ar. Akheimastos, V. Kartalas, K. Trianrafyllou, Emm. Kavelakis and Pr. Kritselis.

The following colonels were promoted to the rank of brigadier general: Khr. Georgopoulos, Al. Giannas, Kon. Persidis, Dion, Samouris, N. Trandas, N. Kallimanis, N. Lefantzis, St. Kougindakis, G. Khondros, Khar. Poshkis, Dim. Pierrakos, Dim. Papadopoulos, Evang. Nikolettopoulos or Lamis, Milt. Sidiropoulos, G. Gialouris, Dim. Kaplanis, I. Manousakis, Savvas Athanasiadis, Dim. Kranias, Nik. Belmbas, G. Kapnisis, Khr. Maltezos, G. Protsivelis, Ath. Saterlis, Andreas Sfakianakis, Sot. Katsaros, Kon. Voulgaris, G. Stathopoulos, G. Kougitakis, Pan. Klendros, G. Stathopoulos, G. Kougitakis, Pan. Klendros, Nikh. Paximadakis, G. Bardis, Emm. Perissakis, Evst. Belogiannis, Diam. Niarkhos, Khr. Arkhimandritis, Kon. Azas, Man. Franzeskakis, St. Giourelis, Kon. Tsianos, I. Manaios, M. Kondakis, Sp. Kastanakis, Evst. Karathanasis, Kon. Manolopoulos, Pan. Panagakos, Dim. Athanasopoulos, Pan. Tegos, Vas. Papakostas, G. Mikas, and Dim. Iordanidis.

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CSO: 3521/214

MILITARY

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR LAW APPROVED--The National Assembly approved unanimously yesterday the law on conscientious objectors, which had already been temporarily recognized by military authorities. This is a way to settle the situation of approximately 30,000 young men who have claimed this status during the past 8 years. The legislation envisions a compulsory civic service of a social character as an alternative to military service. This service can also be performed in cooperation projects with Lusophone countries. [Excerpt] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 23 Mar 85 p 1]

CSO: 3542/154

ECONOMIC

CYPRUS

HIGHER DEFICIT, FEWER IMPORTS IN 1984

Nicosia 0 FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 8 Mar 85 p 1

/Text/ The December 1984 Foreign Trade statistical report, which was made public yesterday, points out that the trade balance deficit--including the cost of two aircraft for Cyprus Airlines--increased by 78.3 million pounds or 20.5 percent. Yet, the report states, the considerably greater rate of increase of total exports compared to total imports (excluding the cost of the two planes) resulted in a noticeable decrease in the rate of increase of the trade deficit.

Thus, while the trade balance deficit during the 1983 January-December period increased by 67.7 million pounds or 21.6 percent, during the corresponding 1984 period the increase in the trade balance was limited to 18.5 million pounds or 4.9 percent.

In the meantime, 1984 consumption of oil products more than doubled. As a result their imports reached 18.3 million pounds compared to 7.9 million pounds in 1983.

Total imports of goods (for local consumption and for stored reserves) increased in December by 15.6 percent and reached 65.2 million pounds compared to 56.4 million pounds in the corresponding 1983 month.

Total exports (domestic and re-exports) in December increased by 2.7 percent and reached 26.4 million pounds compared to 25.7 million pounds in December 1983.

Positive Developments

On the other hand, developments in our foreign trade were positive. The total 1984 exports of goods (domestic and re-exports) increased by 29.3 percent and reached 336.8 million pounds compared to a decrease by 1.2 percent during the 1983 January-December period.

The 1984 imports for local consumption (including the cost of the two Cyprus Airlines planes in March 1984) increased by 23.6 percent and reached 701.8 million pounds compared to 567.6 million during the 1983 January-December period. If the cost of the planes is subtracted, this increase will be only 13.1 percent.

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ECONOMIC

CYPRUS

#### SATISFACTORY VIEW OF 1984 ECONOMY REPORTED

Nicosia 0 AGON in Greek 16 Mar 85 p 12

/Text/ Reviewing 1984 economic developments and 1985 prospects the Economic Bulletin of the Popular Bank states that last year the economy showed substantial improvement and most of the economic magnitudes showed a noticeable upturn while the real development rate rose to 5 percent.

The Bulletin also stated that 1985 fixed investments, including the purchase of additional aircraft for Cyprus Airlines, will reach around 400 million pounds but in real terms this figure will drop by 6 percent. It also stated that:

- A. In 1984 the Gross National Income /AEP/ increased by 13 percent or by about 4.8 percent in real terms.
- B. In 1985 the real AEP increase is expected to reach 3.5-4.0 percent. In current prices the increase rate is expected to be 11-12 percent and, as a result, the AEP will reach 1.4 billion pounds.
- C. It is anticipated that inflation and unemployment will increase rather slightly. The fiscal and trade deficits will worsen while foreign debt will increase.
- D. In 1984 the private consumption demand in current prices reached almost 800 million pounds. It marked, that is, an increase rate of 9.4 percent compared to 12 percent in 1983 and 17.8 percent in 1982.

The downward trend of the marginal preference for consumption of imported consumer goods was an encouraging development while the demand of certain categories of goods such as private use automobiles marked a slowdown.

According to preliminary forecasts of the Popular Bank, it is anticipated that in 1985 the real increase rate of private consumer demand will show an increase of about 4 percent.

E. For the first time since 1978, public consumption marked a rate of increase around 10 percent in current prices and reached 209 million pounds compared to 14.3 percent in 1983 and to the average increase rate of 25.5 percent during the 1978-82 period.

It is estimated that public consumption increased by 2 percent in 1980 fixed prices compared to 4.5 percent in 1983. In other words it increased at a rate lower than the rate of private consumption. It is anticipated that public consumption in 1985 will fluctuate around the 1984 level.

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CS0: 3521/226

ECONOMIC

GREECE

LOSSES AFFECT LARGE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 14 Mar 85 pp 1, 3

/Text/ Under the pressure of colossal losses large industries are folding up one after another. Only 2 out of 10 large industrial complexes showed profits in 1983. They are the state-controlled Aspropyrgos Refineries, which are exploiting the Greek market in a monopolistic and preferential way, and the foreign company PESSINE. Of the remaining eight, only Vardinogianis Motor Oil Co. met its obligations, barely, while the rest suffered tremendous losses.

More specifically, in 1983 the state-controlled Greek aircraft industry lost more than 1 billion drachmas, the General Cement Corporation lost 1,289 million drachmas despite the schemes used by its appointed management. Peiraiki-Petraiki lost 3,011 billion, Hellenic Steel 1,225 million, LARKO 3,140 million, the Greek shipyards 1, 526 million, and Metalourgiki-Khalyps 270 million drachmas.

Of the other large Greek industries the following suffered losses: Khalkis Cement Co. (1,589 million drachmas), Elefsis Shipyards (1,907 million), Greek Beer Co. (1,700 million), the Skalistiris complex (3,590 million), and many others.

This disastrous course of the large industries--a course which destroys the myth entertained by the naive about monopolies--had multiple and most injurious consequences on the country. Thus:

- A. It breaks down whole industrial sectors which are of strategic importance to the country's future survival in an acute international competition. This situation concerns heavy industries whose health is indispensable to the national defense as well as to the country's independence.
- B. It threatens jobs and income of the Greek people. The 12 large industries which showed tremendous losses employ more than 30,000 workers and employees who at any moment may become unemployed.
- C. It dangerously increases the public sector deficits which feed inflation and threaten the state with overall bankruptcy.

These data regarding the state of the industries in 1983--the 1984 situation appears to be worse--derive from a study of the information provided by the ICAP economic guide. Specifically, ICAP announced that:

The economic results of the companies were better in 1983 than in 1982. However, they reveal a serious worsening of the economic structure of the larger Greek industrial complexes. Gross profits increased but outlays increased as well with the result that there were no net profits. The total efficiency of their assets remained negative even though it was better than the previous year. The large industries showed greater obligations while the accumulated losses (of all companies) reduced their assets to such a point that many of them operate with borrowed capital. These companies face a serious economic situation as a result of the existing high interest rates and their objective inability to increase factory prices.

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ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

FOOD FOR WEAPONS--Portugal is one of the countries that proposed an exchange of weapons and other military materiel to Thailand in exchange for Thai food products, a government spokesman announced in Bangkok. According to the spokesman of the Ministry of Defense of Thailand, the Thai government approved on Wednesday the principle of the exchange of surplus agricultural products for armaments. Besides Portugal, South Korea is among the countries that proposed this barter to Thailand. [Excerpt] [Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 29 Mar 85 p 3]

CSO: 3542/154

ECONOMIC

SPAIN

FOREIGN DEMAND, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES RESPONSIBLE FOR 1984 GROWTH

Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 5 Feb 85 p 53

[Article by Primo Gonzalez]

[Text] More concrete data are being published on the progress of the Spanish economy during 1984, a fiscal year that was marked by a considerable growth in external demand. Nevertheless, investment declined for the fourth consecutive year.

Madrid--Last year, the Spanish economy underwent a real growth rate of 2.5 percent, which would be the highest economic growth rate attained by the Spanish economy since the 3.3 percent achieved in 1977, just before the second oil crisis. This is the most reliable estimate at present, which is agreed upon almost totally by experts from the private sector and the government. Today, Tuesday, the Ministry of Economy will submit its report on the economic progress during 1984, while starting the periodic publication of a series of new monthly and quarterly publications to report in a more timely manner on our economy's progress.

The most prominent features of the economic progress last year consisted of a negative growth in domestic demand, including the gross formation of fixed capital (investment) and a sizable growth in the foreign demand, possibly the largest in the past 20 years, an obvious moderation in the inflation rate, the elimination of the external deficit and an increase in the business surplus, as more positive aspects; in contrast to the persistence of the public deficit, increased unemployment and the destruction of employment which, combined with the decline in investment for the fourth consecutive year, would be the more negative features.

The Supply

From the standpoint of supply, the sharp decline in the activity of the construction sector is the most significant datum, in contrast to the growth experienced in the agrarian sector. The latest estimates on the crisis in construction point to a real decline of about 4 percent, following a 1.5 percent drop the year before. Thus, the construction sector has reached its lowest level in recent years; because in 1982 it had experienced a slight break in its long crisis which began in 1975.

The agrarian sector, on the other hand, should undergo a real growth of about 7.3 percent, which would be the highest since 1980, consequently contributing about half a point of growth to the gross domestic product during the entire year.

Industrial activity appears to have recovered throughout the year, attaining a rate of growth no less than 3 percent; although the most recent data, pertaining to the month of October, show an acceleration of the growth rate in this basic sector of the economy.

The evaluations of the tertiary sector indicate a growth of about 2.5 percent, which would represent a contribution of approximately 1.5 points to the total growth of the economy for the whole year.

The inaccuracy of the figures for the industrial sector is the reason for the delay in the exact report on the real growth in the economy during 1984, which will take several more weeks.

#### The External Expansion

The most significant feature of the economy, in any event, has been provided by the external sector, the real driving force for the economic growth in 1984; because the rise in the supply has been directed completely outside, to the point where the domestic demand, by itself, would have deprived the Spanish economy of growth capacity during 1984. In fact, because the foreign demand for goods and services has increased over 16.5 percent in real terms, this growth may have contributed approximately 3.4 percent to the GDP as a whole; later becoming reduced owing to a negative contribution from the foreign demand for goods and services (total imports of goods and services are due to increase 2.3 percent in real terms, which is equivalent to a drop of about 0.5 percent in the GDP), and an also negative contribution from the domestic demand, which may have declined about 0.4 percent, thereby removing a similar portion from the GDP.

The considerable cut in personal income which occurred throughout the year has caused a decline of nearly 0.6 percent in private consumption; while public consumption has experienced real growth of 3 percent, owing mainly (according to reliable estimates) to the increase in consumption on the part of the autonomous entities.

#### Improvement in the Surplus

Based on the foregoing data, the estimate of the business surplus last year underwent a considerable improvement of about 20 percent, before taxes, thereby consolidating a trend begun modestly in 1982.

Last year, according to some private analysts, the unit cost of labor showed a retrogression of about 5 percent in its annual growth rate, as compared with increments of approximately 10 percent during the 2 previous years. Nevertheless, this 5 percent increase in the unit cost of labor is considerably larger than that of the West European industrialized countries and those of the OEDC area.

The most negative features of the economic progress last year are still the large public deficit, the relative size of which should undergo a stagnation or even a slight decline, despite its considerable volume in absolute terms, and the rise in unemployment; because in 1984 about 200,000 jobs were destroyed, twice the number in the preceding year, although the 1984 figures must be corrected on the basis of certain changes in classification (agricultural employment in Andalucia and Extremadura). Even with this exception, which would cut the number of destroyed jobs in half, the increase in unemployment will involve about 250,000 person, based on the assumption that the active population will have increased by approximately 150,000 persons.

Gross Domestic Product. Components of the Demand					Constant Price, Percents	
Year	Domestic	Gross	Domestic	Exports of	Imports of	GDP at
Growth Rates	Consumption	Capital	Demand	Goods and	Goods and	Market
		Formation		Services	Services	Prices
1973	7.9	12.6	9.0	9.0	16.5	7.8
1974	5.5	10.6	6.8	0.8	7.7	5.7
1975	2.7	-3.6	1.1	-1.5	-1.1	1.1
1976	4.7	-1.4	3.2	10.1	10.1	3.0
1977	2.7	-4.0	1.1	8.5	-4.7	3.3
1978	1.8	-6.4	0.0	10.7	-0.7	1.8
1979	1.5	-1.1	1.0	6.4	11.5	0.2
1980	1.7	3.9	2.1	0.6	3.8	1.5
1981	-0.6	-5.1	-1.5	6.9	-2.8	0.2
1982	1.3	-1.8	0.7	7.1	4.5	1.2
1983	1.2	-1.5	0.6	7.6	-0.6	2.3
1984	-0.5	-2.0	-0.4	16.5	2.3	2.5

#### Macroeconomic Chart, 1984

	Variations From 1983 (%)		
	Real Growth	Price Increases	Contribution to the GDP
GDP at market prices	2.5	11.2	+2.48
Private consumption (residents)	-0.6	11.3	-0.42
Public consumption	3.0	9.5	+0.37
Gross capital formation	-2.0	11.8	-0.38
Fixed capital	-2.5	11.8	-0.47
Variation in stocks	54.8	12.5	+0.09
Domestic demand	-0.4	11.2	-0.43
Exports of goods and services	16.5	12.7	+3.40
Imports of goods and services	2.3	12.8	-0.49
External balance	-	-	+2.91
GDP at cost of factors	2.5	11.0	+2.48
Primary sector	7.3	11.6	+0.46
Secondary sector	1.6	11.1	+0.57
- Industry	3.0	11.3	+0.86
- Construction	-4.0	10.3	-0.29
Tertiary sector	2.5	10.8	+1.45

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